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‘Modern radiation therapy, if nothing else, is a triumph of precision 
engineering. The gantry of a linear accelerator weighs 3 tons, the couch 1.5 
tons. The gantry can be rotated through 360˚ and positioned with an 
accuracy of one tenth of a degree. The 4.5 tons of couch and gantry, weighs 
as much as three family cars and can be moved so that the isocentre can 
be located within a sphere of 2 mm diameter. If we put that on a dartboard: 
we can place an object, weighing 750 kg, to lie within 0.05 mm of any 
desired position on the periphery of the dartboard’ (Faithfull & Wells, 2004: 
35). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
From January to June 2007 a clinical quality audit was performed at the 
Oncotherapy Department, Universitas Annexe, Bloemfontein to identify 
deviations from the planned arrangements of quality activities and to initiate 
corrective actions in the event of any deviations observed. The objective of 
the audit was to set up a quality control procedure manual, designed to 
minimise the occurrence and consequences of any events which could lead 
to an adverse incident in the radiation therapy schedule of a patient and 
thus potentially have an impact on the quality and safety of patient 
treatment. 
 
A total of 7 838 patients were treated with 37 026 radiation treatment fields 
in 11 466 radiation treatments, during the period of the study at the 
Oncotherapy Department, Universitas Annexe, Bloemfontein. During this 
time a total of 15 minor adverse incidents were reported: 46% were due to 
errors in dose calculations; 13% respectively, due to incorrect patient 
positioning, error in field positioning and incorrect lead shielding and 7% 
respectively, due to treatment unit malfunction and incorrect radiation 
treatment energy.   
 
The study contributed to the advancement of the quality control 
management system at the Oncotherapy Department, Universitas Annexe, 
Bloemfontein, with the focus on the radiation treatment delivery process. 
Information obtained from the study was used in conjunction with 
information obtained from the literature study to generate a quality control 
procedure manual to facilitate in the monitoring, evaluation and 
improvement of the quality of radiation therapy at the Oncotherapy 
Department at Universitas Annexe, Bloemfontein. Once implemented, 
procedures and/or protocols in this manual can now assist in more accurate, 
effective and higher quality radiation treatment delivery. 
OPSOMMING 
 
 ‘n Kliniese oudit is uitgevoer, vanaf Januarie tot Junie 2007, by die 
Onkoterapie Departement, Universitas Annex, Bloemfontein, om enige 
deviasies in kwaliteitsaktiwiteite vanaf die beplande handelinge te kontroleer 
en om die korrekte aksies te inisieer in die geval van enige geobserveerde 
deviasies. Die objektief van die oudit was die samestelling van ‘n 
kwaliteitskontrole prosedure handleiding, wat ontwerp is om die voorkoms 
en gevolge van enige gebeure wat kan lei tot ‘n adverse insident in die 
bestralingsterapie regime van die pasiënt en ‘n potensiële impak op die 
kwaliteit en veiligheid van die pasiënt se behandeling kan hê, tot ‘n minium 
te beperk. 
 
‘n Totaal van 7 838 pasiënte is behandel met 37 026 bestralings velde in 11 
466 bestralingsbehandelings tydens die periode van die studie by die 
Onkoterapie Departement, Universitas Annex, Bloemfontein. Gedurende 
hierdie tyd is ‘n totaal van 15 minor adverse insidente gerapporteer: 46% 
was as gevolg van foutiewe dosisberekeninge; 13% as gevolg van foutiewe 
pasiënt posisionering, foutiewe veld posisionering en foutiewe afskerming, 
respektiewelik en 7% as gevolg van behandelingseenheid wanfunksionering 
en foutiewe behandelingsenergie, respektiewelik. 
 
Die studie het bygedra tot die bevordering van die kwaliteitskontrole 
bestuursisteem by die Onkoterapie Departement, Universitas Annex, 
Bloemfontein, met die fokus op die bestralingsterapie leweringsproses. 
Inligting wat ingevorder is met die studie is in samewerking met literatuur 
inligting gebruik vir die ontwerp van die kwaliteitskontrole prosedure 
handleiding om te fasilliteer in die monitering, evaluasie en verbetering van 
die superioriteit van bestralingsterapie. Met die implementering van die 
handleiding kan die prosedures en/of protokolle bydra tot meer akkurate, 
effektiewe en hoër kwaliteit bestralingsterapie.    
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CHAPTER 1 
 
ORIENTATION TO THE STUDY 
      
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
On 27 February 2001 a transitory loss of electrical power resulted in the 
automatic shutdown of a Polish built NEPTUN 10P® type linear accelerator 
during the radiation treatment of a patient at the Białystok Oncology Centre 
in Poland. After the electrical power was restored the linear accelerator was 
restarted, the controls checked and radiation treatment continued. The 
patient receiving radiation treatment at the time of the incident as well as 
four other patients received further radiation treatment. During the radiation 
treatment, two patients experienced itching and burning sensations. This led 
to the staff terminating the treatment. After numerous tests the discovery 
was made that the machine’s output was significantly higher than expected, 
the dose monitoring system of the accelerator was not functioning properly, 
and that one of the electronic components of the safety interlock system 
was damaged. Thus, a radiation accident occurred where five patients 
developed local radiation injuries of varying severity. Medical examination 
revealed that the local injuries of all five patients were worsening 
significantly and required surgical treatment (International Atomic Energy 
Agency Vienna, 2004: 1). This is but one of many radiation therapy 
incidents that occur annually all over the world. What is radiation therapy 
and how can these incidents be avoided? 
 
Radiation therapy, in its numerous forms, e.g. external beam radiotherapy, 
intracavity and intraluminal therapy, plays an essential role in the treatment 
of most primary malignant tumours and metastatic disease (Griffiths & 
Short, 1994: 1). One third of all cancers can be cured if the best available 
method of treatment is used (Chapman & Hall Medical, 1997: 21). 
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According to the American College of Radiology (ACR) (2006: 923) up to 
sixty percent of cancer patients are treated with radiation therapy either to 
cure the patient or for palliative relief. 
 
Radiation therapy of cancer patients involves the selection of an intended 
target volume to provide sufficient coverage of the tumour volume and any 
relevant surrounding margins, which includes any microscopic spread and 
patient movement variations in the radiation treatment area. An adequately 
high dose of radiation has to be delivered to this intended target volume 
while taking into consideration the probability of complications in the normal 
tissues surrounding the target volume (Leer, McKenzie, Scalliet & Thwaites, 
1998: 5). Early complications can appear during the radiation therapy 
course or immediately after completing the radiation therapy course. The 
late effects usually transpire between 12 and 24 months after the treatment 
and may develop gradually throughout the rest of the patient’s life (Tubiana, 
Dutreix & Wambersie, 1990: 141). 
 
Thus, taking into consideration the strong demands that tumour control and 
normal tissue complications make on the accuracy and precision of the 
radiation treatment delivered to the patient it is evident that radiation therapy 
of cancer patients is a multidisciplinary speciality, using complex equipment 
and procedures for the assessment, planning and delivery of treatment. Due 
to the intricate nature of the radiotherapy process, quality assurance (QA) 
and quality control (QC) should be greatly emphasised throughout the 
entirety of the delivery process of radiation treatment (Leer et al., 1998: 5).  
 
According to Leer et al., (1998: 9), people and apparatus are fallible and in 
any activity performed is the possibility of it being inaccurate. It seems 
unlikely that any individual can carry out even a routine procedure 
repeatedly without eventually making a mistake. For example, a person 
cannot go to work everyday over a career of approximately 40 years and 
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handle computers, calculators and highly specialised equipment without 
ever making a mistake. If a mistake is made in radiation therapy it presents 
unique challenges in the regard that the radiation cannot be seen, heard, 
smelled, felt, or tasted (Leer et al., 1998: 9). 
 
This chapter provides a brief orientation of the study. The study will be 
outlined in the various categories of importance. This incorporates the 
introduction to the study, audits and inquisitions, adverse incidents, the 
problem statement, the research objectives, outcome of the study, 
significance of the study, research methodology, statistical analysis and 
data presentation, ethical aspects, manpower and infrastructure, the 
arrangement of the dissertation and the conclusion. 
 
1.2. AUDITS AT THE ONCOTHERAPY DEPARTMENT OF UNIVERSITAS 
ANNEXE 
 
Representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited 
the Oncotherapy Department at Universitas Annexe (the department), 
Bloemfontein in 2004 as part of their investigation of radiation therapy 
departments in South Africa. In the report, they concluded that the centre is 
suitable to perform the functions that the IAEA requires from an oncology 
centre of competence (IAEA Report, 2004).   
   
However, they did find the lack of portal imaging as a routine verification of 
field set-up, surprising. It was acknowledged that the lack of resources 
barely allowed for the use of X-ray films. At the time of the study , two of the 
four linear accelerators, the Elekta SL25 (Elekta Limited SL25, 2003) and 
the Elekta Precise (Elekta Limited, 2003), have been equipped with portal 
imaging and a third one, the SL75-5 (Philips Radiotherapy Systems SL75-5, 
1988) is in the process of being fitted with a portal imaging device (IAEA 
Report, 2004). 
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The IAEA representatives also noted that International Commission of 
Radiation Units and Measurements (ICRU) reports are not followed for 
reporting adverse incidents, according to international standard. However, 
there is a high level of consistency within the department for dose 
specification and reporting of radiation treatment (IAEA Report, 2004). 
 
The department was audited and accredited by the Council of Health 
Service Accreditation of South Africa (COHSASA) in March 2004. 
COHSASA assists health care facilities to meet quality standards and 
maintain those standards once they have been achieved. Through its quality 
improvement methods, the organisation empowers health care 
professionals to measure themselves against their quality standards and 
monitor the improvements. COHSASA inspected the treatment, the method 
of treatment and the quality of the treatment that the patients received. Their 
overall impression of the department was agreeable and they concluded 
that the treatment received by the patients was up to standard (COHSASA 
Report, 2004).  
 
The findings from these audits and conclusions point to the fact that the 
quality of the radiation treatment at the department, adheres to the 
standards of COHSASA but, that quality aspects, such as the reporting 
procedures, can be revised and formalised in a QC procedure manual for 
the department. 
 
1.3. ADVERSE INCIDENTS 
 
The fact that radiation treatment preparation and delivery consists of various 
links like the localization, simulation, dosimetry and the treatment of the 
tumour, with each link comprising of approximately 50 parameters for every 
treatment field, makes it a complex treatment process that may generate 
errors in every step (Van Esh, Bogaerts, Kutcher & Huyskens, 2000: 110). 
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The transfer of data at the simulator, treatment planning system, ‘record-
and-verify’ (RV) system and the radiation treatment unit is prone to errors 
that will vary between departments depending on the organisation, 
equipment, information generation and transfer as well as error handling 
and documentation of a department. The development of improved control 
and quality mechanisms is necessary due to the ever-increasing complexity 
of the radiation treatment process that leads to an increased probability of 
adverse incidents (Van Esh et al., 2000: 110).  
 
Adverse incidents leading to the inaccurate delivery of radiation treatment to 
a patient can occur at any of the numerous complex processes used to 
reach the planned end result of the treatment. This can include the 
diagnosis of the patient, the choice of treatment by the oncologist, the 
planning of the treatment, the manufacturing of the shielding and bolus used 
in the radiation treatment and the delivering of the treatment itself. 
 
Over a period of six months an estimated 12 000 radiation treatment fields 
are used to treat an average of 130 patients every weekday from Monday to 
Friday at the Radiation Therapy Department of the Universitas Annexe. 
Although every step of the radiation treatment process is checked and 
double-checked by the radiation therapists, as well as the medical 
physicists, there is still ample opportunity for errors to be generated.  
  
According to the American Association of Physicists in Medicine (AAPM) 
Radiation Therapy Committee Task Group 40 the International Commission 
of Radiation Units and Measurements (ICRU) recommends that the 
radiation dose delivered to the patient should be within 5% of the prescribed 
total radiation dose. Bearing in mind the many steps and parameters 
involved in delivering radiation dose to the intended target volume in a 
patient, each step must be performed with an accuracy much better than 
5% to achieve the ICRU recommendation (Kutcher, Coia, Gillin, Hanson, 
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Leibel, Morton, Palta, Purdy, Reinstein, Svensson, Weller & Wingfield, 
1994: 584).  
 
A systematic approach, with formalised and comprehensive quality systems 
and programmes, is necessary for the carrying out of radiation therapy. This 
is due to the increasing complexity of radiation therapy techniques as well 
as some recommendations following reported adverse incidents. The 
implementation of a good quality system can be a tool for reducing the 
frequency and effects of adverse incidents and thus providing good quality 
radiation treatment (Leer et al., 1998: 9). 
 
1.4. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Although QC procedures relating to the set-up and execution of radiation 
treatment are followed on a daily basis, the lack of formal written QC 
protocols to use as a standard for the delivery of radiation treatment at the 
department is a concern. Procedures to record and report any adverse 
incidents leading to inaccurate delivery of radiation treatment do not 
currently exist at the department. This was also concluded by the IAEA and 
COHSASA during their audits and inquisitions (IAEA Report, 2004) 
(COHSASA Report, 2004). 
 
1.5. AIM OF THE STUDY  
 
The aim of the study was to identify deviations from the planned daily quality 
activities and to have corrective actions in place, which can be immediately 
initiated in the event of any deviations being observed. The objective is to 
set up QC methods, which can be followed on a daily basis and are 
designed to minimise the occurrence and consequences of any actions, 
which could potentially affect the intended outcome of the radiation 
treatment of the patient (Leer et al., 1998: 74).  
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1.6. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The objectives of this study: 
1. Determine the origin and frequency of adverse incidents leading to 
inaccurate delivery of radiation therapy to patients at the Oncotherapy 
Department, Universitas Annexe, Bloemfontein and classify these 
adverse incidents as major or minor adverse incidents. 
2. Compare the results of the study with other radiation therapy centres 
that have published information on the prevalence of adverse incidents 
in radiation therapy delivery.  
3. Develop a QC procedure manual that will focus on the responsibility of 
radiation therapists in QC and assurance procedures. The QC 
procedure manual will contain guidelines to reduce and / or eliminate 
adverse incidents leading to inaccurate delivery of radiation during the 
course of radiation treatment of a patient. It will also outline the role of 
the radiation therapist in QA at the department. 
 
1.7. OUTCOME OF THE STUDY 
 
Information obtained from the study will be used as a basis to compile and 
design a QC procedure manual for the department. Through the 
assessment of the origin and frequency of adverse incidents during 
radiation therapy at the department an adverse incident report procedure 
and form was designed to assist in the monitoring of deviations and need for 
improvements in the daily QC methods. These results were then 
incorporated in the QC procedure manual, which will assist in the 
identification and documentation of adverse incidents. Implementing the QC 
procedure manual will ultimately reduce and/or eliminate adverse incidents 
to improve the quality of radiation treatment delivered. 
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Procedures and / or protocols in this manual have the aim to support a more 
accurate and effective radiation treatment delivery with an overall 
enhancement in the quality standards of the treatment. This QC procedure 
manual includes the responsibilities of radiation therapists regarding QC 
procedures during the course of radiation treatment of a patient. According 
to Roth, Roser, Brunner & Sander (1998: 84) QC is one of the biggest 
components of QA and thus with the improvement of QC procedures, the 
study will contribute to the advancement of the QA management system, 
with the focus on the treatment delivery process. 
 
The results of the study will be used for the completion of a dissertation for a 
Masters Technologiae qualification. The data will also be published.   
 
1.8. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The focus of this study is to address the incident prone areas in treatment 
delivery to patients and to identify the adverse incidents leading to the 
inaccurate delivery of radiation therapy. This means that a radiation 
treatment to a patient deviated from the prescribed treatment to the target 
volume. In addition, the information collected from the above-mentioned 
was used to compile a QC procedure manual.  
 
This QC procedure manual will provide the department with an effective 
method of reporting adverse incidents and finding ways of improving 
radiation treatment delivery with the minimum number of adverse incidents. 
It will also facilitate superior radiation treatment delivery at the department.   
 
1.9. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
A clinical audit on adverse incidents was performed at the department from 
January 2007 to end of June 2007. For a period of six months, any adverse 
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incidents occurring during the radiation therapy of a patient at the 
department were monitored.  
 
1.9.1. Adverse Incidents 
As previously discussed, all the steps involved in the delivery of the 
radiation therapy to a patient should be carried out with accuracies much 
better than 5% to achieve the ICRU recommendation for the total radiation 
dose to be within 5% of the prescribed total radiation dose (Kutcher et al., 
1994: 584). If an incident occurs that causes a deviation from the prescribed 
radiation dose it can be referred to as an adverse incident. An adverse 
incident with a deviation of less than 5% from the prescribed radiation 
treatment protocol still falls within tolerance and acceptable limits, as 
recommended by the ICRU and are referred to as a minor adverse incident. 
A deviation of more than 5% from the prescribed radiation treatment is 
referred to as a major adverse incident (Kutcher et al., 1994: 584).   
 
These adverse incidents include any events that result in a deviation from 
the prescribed treatment and according to Swann-D’Emilia, Chu & Daywalt 
(1990: 186) can be categorised as the following: 
 Errors in dose calculations; 
 Incorrect use of shielding, wedges, field sizes, gantry angle 
collimation or bolus; 
 Incorrect patient positioning;  
 Treatment unit malfunctions during treatment that results in a 
deviation from the prescribed dose. 
 
1.9.2. Adverse Incident Report Form 
An adverse incident report form (See Appendix 2) was designed to capture 
the relevant information about any adverse incidents that came about. This 
document provides a description of the adverse incident, the origin of the 
adverse incident and steps taken to correct it. Upon identification of an 
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adverse incident, the radiation therapist in charge of the sub-section should 
immediately complete the adverse incident report. The adverse incident was 
then reported to the oncologist in charge of the treatment of the patient. The 
oncologist and the reporting radiation therapist both signed the report (See 
Appendix 2).  
 
1.9.3. Data Collection 
The adverse incident reports were filed at the treatment units and the 
researcher collected the forms weekly. The adverse incidents were 
recorded on data forms (See Appendix 3) on which the adverse incidents 
were divided into major (>5%) and minor (<5%) categories (See 1.9.1.). 
Discussions were held where the adverse incident, the origin and 
preventative steps were reviewed with all personnel involved. Minutes of the 
meetings were taken and kept for future reference and corroboration of the 
study. The information obtained from the adverse incident report forms and 
the meetings was incorporated in the QC procedure manual. 
 
1.9.4. Data Processing 
An analysis of the documented adverse incidents was done by examining 
the magnitude (quality) of the adverse incident and categorising it into major 
and minor adverse incidents. The expertise of a medical physicist was 
obtained in the categorising of adverse incidents. The importance of an 
individual adverse incident was determined by the deviation from the 
prescribed dose. Any deviations of less than 5% from the prescribed 
treatment was classified as minor adverse incidents while deviations of 
more than 5% was classified as major adverse incidents. This classification 
was done according to the ICRU recommendation (Kutcher et al., 1994: 
584).  
 
A quantitative analysis was done by taking into consideration the number of 
adverse incidents reported. Data forms were completed where the 
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occurrence of the adverse incidents was noted and the adverse incidents 
were divided into major and minor categories (3.2). The results obtained 
from this study were then compared with other centres that have published 
articles in this field. 
  
1.9.5. Preliminary Investigation 
A preliminary investigation was done over a period of eight months in 2005 
to determine whether an extensive investigation was feasible. The efficiency 
of the adverse incident report forms was also established. From February 
2005, preliminary adverse incident report forms that have been completed 
with the occurrence of any actions leading to deviations from the prescribed 
radiation treatment were collected monthly and quantitive analyses of the 
documented adverse incidents were done. 
 
The results obtained from the preliminary investigation illustrated that a 
more extensive investigation was justified and would be welcomed at the 
department. It was also evident from the preliminary investigation and 
feedback that the original adverse incident report forms needed some 
adjustments (See 3.2.5. for more detail). 
 
1.9.6. Quality Control Procedure Manual 
A written QC procedure manual was developed, for the radiation therapists, 
which detailed the quality procedures, the frequency at which these quality 
procedures needed to be performed, the action criteria that should be 
followed to apply the procedures, the records that should be kept and the 
responsibility to perform these procedures in the department. 
 
A framework of all the QC protocols, applicable to radiation therapists, 
regarding the treatment units, the planning systems, dose calculations, 
treatment files, the actual radiation treatment and patient care were 
established through utilizing the guidelines given by the AAPM Radiation 
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Therapy Committee Task Group 40 in their report on Comprehensive 
Quality Assurance for Radiation Oncology (Kutcher et al., 1994: 583-615). 
This framework together with the information acquired from the monitoring 
and investigation of the reported adverse incidents were used in conjunction 
with the knowledge obtained from the literature study on quality assurance 
and quality control in the development of the QC procedure manual. 
 
1.10. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND DATA PRESENTATION 
 
A quantitative analysis of the documented adverse incidents was done to 
determine the frequency of the adverse incidents in their different 
categories. A proportional test was done to determine the statistical 
differences in comparison with other centres that have published articles in 
this field.  
 
Tables and graphs were used in the presentation of the results. Frequency 
distribution tables will demonstrate the number of observations falling in 
each class. Graphic presentations of the data will be done to demonstrate 
the data’s general structure and to emphasize and reveal trends and 
relationships more distinctly (Lues, 2002: 20). 
 
1.11. ETHICAL ASPECTS 
 
The proposal was submitted to the Ethics Committee of the University of the 
Free State for approval and to determine if it falls within an appropriate code 
of practice. It received the necessary clearance and was provided with the 
following ethics code: ETOVS 33/06. 
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1.12. MANPOWER AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
A complete functioning Oncotherapy Department with all the apparatus and 
personnel was needed for this study. Permission to conduct the study was 
obtained from the head of the department (See Appendix 1). This 
department was available and fully co-operative. This includes all the pre-
treatment and treatment units as well as the personnel (radiation therapists) 
who were willing to take part in the QC study and documented any adverse 
incidents.  
 
1.13. ARRANGEMENT OF DISSERTATION 
 
Chapter One – This chapter includes a brief overview of the study that 
includes the problem statement, research objectives, outcome, significance, 
research methodology, ethical aspects, manpower and statistical analysis of 
the study.  
 
Chapter Two – An in depth overview from the literature are given about QC 
in radiation therapy and all the aspects of importance to the study are 
addressed.  
 
Chapter Three – In this chapter the research design and methodology are 
explained in detail. All aspects of how the study was performed are 
illustrated.  
 
Chapter Four – This chapter includes the presentation of the results. A 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the reported and documented 
adverse incidents is done. Frequency distribution tables and graphic 
presentations are used to demonstrate the results of the qualitative analysis 
and the proportional tests.  
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Chapter Five – A written QC procedure manual was developed which 
details the QC procedures, their frequency, the action criteria, the records 
and the personnel required to perform them. The study is concluded and 
future recommendations are made.  
 
1.14. CONCLUSION 
 
The delivery of treatment in an accurate and consistent manner is by no 
means easy to achieve. The radiation therapy process is a complex 
interweaving of a number of related tasks for designing and delivering 
radiation treatment to the patient. Chapter 1 offers a glimpse into this world 
of radiation therapy and a little insight into the study. 
 
In Chapter 2, the literature review will be discussed. The areas touched on 
in the literature study in Chapter 1 will be explored and discussed in Chapter 
2.  An in depth overview will be given about QA in radiation therapy and all 
the aspects of importance to the study will be addressed. This includes 
radiation therapy, treatment volume, areas of radiation therapy, the role of 
the radiation therapist in QA procedures, categories of adverse incidents, 
QA, quality systems, the QC procedure manual and previous related 
studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
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LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 2 provides a literature overview about QA and QC in radiation 
therapy and the aspects of their relevance to the study. Included in this 
overview is radiation therapy, treatment volume, the radiation therapy 
process, the role of the radiation therapist in quality procedures, accuracy in 
radiation therapy, QA, QC system, adverse incidents and reporting, the QC 
procedure manual and related studies. 
 
The literature study was done by utilising internet resources, the Central 
University of Technology of the Free State library resources, the Oncology 
Department Universitas Annexe resources, various medical and oncology 
journals, the University of the Free State library and intranet resources and 
by doing a NEXUS search. This included a computer-based search of 
‘Google’ and ‘Google Scholar’ search engines and a ‘PubMed’ search of the 
e-journal collections on radiotherapy, medical physics and nuclear medicine 
were performed. Keywords used during the literature search were radiation 
therapy, radiation therapy incidents, QC in radiation therapy, QA in radiation 
therapy, accidents during radiation therapy, QC procedure manual and the 
role of radiation therapists in QA.  
 
2.2. RADIATION THERAPY 
 
Radiation is not a new man-made invention of the technological age. It has 
always been there and is as old as life itself and ever-present in the 
evolution of life on earth. What is man-made however is the additional 
radiation that humans are subjected to, but which is largely due to medical 
purposes (Moss & Cox, 1989: 1). X-rays were discovered by Roentgen in 
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1895, Becquerel discovered radioactivity in 1896 and radium was isolated 
by Curie in 1898 (Faithfull & Wells, 2004: 71). Although ineffective, radiation 
therapy was used on patients soon after these discoveries. Systemic 
research was done at the Institute Curie in Paris from 1919 until 1930 which 
improved the effectiveness of radiation therapy considerably (Tubiana et al., 
1990: 174). Today, radiation therapy plays an integral role in the curative 
and palliative treatment of cancer (Griffiths & Short, 1994: 1). Chapman & 
Hall (1997: ix) confirm this by saying that radiation therapy is the backbone 
of most cancer care. It has been estimated that one-third of all cancer 
patients will be cured if the best available (optimum) method of treatment 
were used. 
 
So what exactly is radiation therapy? It is the treatment of disease, primarily 
malignant tumours, through the utilisation of electromagnetic and particle 
radiations in the form of external beam radiation and/or radioactive sources 
into the body cavities, which is known as intracavitary or intraluminal 
radiation therapy (Griffiths & Short, 1994: 1). When a malignant tumour is 
exposed to a specific radiobiological pre-determined amount of radiation the 
tumour will be destroyed due to the effects of the exponential cell kill. 
Frequently dividing normal tissue cells adjacent to the radiation area will 
also be killed. However, the tumour may be locally destroyed without 
serious damage to the normal tissue cells by planning the radiation 
treatment so that the tumour receives the highest possible amount of 
radiation with the lowest possible amount of radiation to the normal 
surrounding tissue. Normal tissue cells have a higher capacity for recovery 
and if the radiation therapy is fractionated or spread out the normal tissue 
can recover between treatments (Griffiths & Short, 1994: 2).     
 
Thus, an intended target volume are meticulously selected to provide 
sufficient coverage of the tumour volume and any relevant surrounding 
margins, which includes any microscopic spread and patient movement 
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variations, in the radiation treatment area. An adequately high dose of 
radiation is delivered to this intended target volume while taking into 
consideration the probability of complications in the normal tissues 
surrounding the target volume. It is a multidisciplinary speciality that calls for 
the use of complex equipment and procedures for the assessment, planning 
and delivery of the radiation treatment (Leer et al., 1998: 5). Each step in 
this process involves cooperation, liaison and mutual respect between the 
different staff groups if the patient’s progress is to be as seamless as 
possible (Faithfull & Wells, 2004: 6).  
 
The main areas related to radiation therapy practice are anatomy and 
physiology, oncology, radiobiology, radiation physics and equipment, 
radiation protection, radiation therapy planning and technique and patient 
care, and are all linked through the different phases of the radiation 
treatment process. The prescription of the radiation treatment dose, the 
treatment plan, and radiation treatment delivery must be done accurately 
and appropriately to achieve tumour cure with the minimum normal tissue 
damage. The patients have to be closely observed and monitored for any 
signs indicating intolerance to the radiation treatment regime (Griffiths & 
Short, 1994: 3). Radiation therapy complications may present themselves 
as early complications or late complications. Early complications can be 
observed during or directly after the radiation treatment course whilst the 
late effects of the radiation treatment usually emerge between 12 and 24 
months after the radiation treatment (Thwaites et al., 1995: 62). 
 
According to Faithfull & Wells (2004: 6), a technically successful course of 
radiation therapy is dependent on a number of factors. The clinical target 
volume (CTV) has to identified and evaluated correctly. Then the planning 
target volume (PTV) has be carefully selected and defined before a 
radiation treatment plan is designed to deliver a uniformly high dose of 
radiation to the PTV while taking into consideration the critical structures 
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and the normal surrounding tissue. This radiation dose has to be given in 
the correct fractionation schedule until the optimal dose has been delivered. 
All of this has to be performed accurately with the patient in the correct 
radiation treatment position and with effective patient immobilization to 
ensure consistent patient set-up and exact radiation treatment delivery. 
 
2.3. RADIATION TREATMENT VOLUME 
 
The fundamental aim of radiation therapy is the delivery of a high dose to 
the target volume to control the initial malignant disease. The initial 
malignant disease has to controlled whilst keeping the dose to the normal 
surrounding tissue to a minimum to reduce the risk of damage to the normal 
tissue, which makes the planning and delivery of radiation therapy a 
multistep process that is patient and tumour specific (De Vita, Hellman & 
Rosenburg, 2005: 534) (Mijnheer, Mills & Thwaites, 2007: 408). 
 
The anatomical volume that needs to be treated with radiation therapy are 
determined by taking into consideration the clinical and surgical findings 
during the staging process, the extent of the tumour and the typical area of 
microscopic involvement (Peckham, Pinedo & Veronesi, 1995: 703). This 
area can be described as the volume occupied by the mass of tumour and 
is referred to as the gross tumour volume (GTV) (Griffiths & Short, 1994: 
152). The GTV can include the demonstrable primary tumour, involved 
lymph nodes and/or metastatic disease (Kahn, 2007: 117).    
 
Another biological border is then added to the GTV as an oncological safety 
margin to ensure that any clinically undetectable cancer cells are included in 
the treatment volume. This margin is referred to as the clinical target volume 
and is determined by the tumour characteristics (Peckham et al., 1995: 
703). There can be multiple variations during the course of radiation 
treatment. The patient may lose or gain weight and that can result in a 
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change of the patient’s structure. Rectal or bladder filling can occur as well 
as changes in the size of the tumour. Breathing, swallowing, bowel 
movements and chest movements can also occur during the actual radiation 
treatment. To compensate for these movements internal margins are added 
to the CTV and are called the internal target volume (ITV) (Kahn, 2007: 
117). 
 
It is of utmost importance that the radiation dose applied to the CTV is 
sufficient to ensure adequate tumour control and to minimise the risk of 
recurrence (Tschirley, Beier & Wust, 1999: 1). Thus, yet another border, the 
planned target volume (PTV), is added to the ITV. This border compensates 
for technical uncertainties that are caused by potential localisation errors, 
incorrect simulation procedures and difficulties with the reproducibility of the 
treatment positions (Peckham et al., 1995: 703). This makes the planning 
and delivery of radiation therapy patient and tumour specific (De Vita, 
Hellman & Rosenburg, 2005: 534).  
  
Taking into consideration that a high dose of radiation needs to be delivered 
to the PTV while, the dose to the normal surrounding structures and tissues 
should be kept to a minimum, it is evident that strong demands are made on 
the accuracy and precision of every step involved in the process of radiation 
treatment delivery. This, in turn, leads to an emphasis on the QA and QC on 
all of the steps, processes and equipment involved in the delivery of 
radiation treatment (Leer et al., 1998: 5).  
 
2.4. THE RADIATION THERAPY PROCESS 
 
The multifaceted interlinks between the numerous related tasks necessary 
for the design and delivery of the radiation treatments makes the accurate 
and consistent delivery of radiation therapy very challenging (Kutcher et al., 
1994: 583). 
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In order to determine the extent of the disease patient-specific information is 
acquired from numerous diagnostic imaging sources such as conventional 
radiography, computerised tomography (CT), sonography, magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) and nuclear medicine imaging (NMI) (Kutcher et 
al., 1994: 583). Once the decision to treat the patient with radiation therapy 
has been made, the patient is simulated or localised. Diagnostic patient-
specific information and parameters are fused to determine the size, extent 
and location of the target volume in relation to the surrounding normal tissue 
and the external anatomical landmarks. Radiation therapy simulators and 
CTs are used for this process as well as for the simulation of the treatment 
plan (Fraass, Doppke, Hunt, Kutcher, Starkschall, Stern & Van Dyke, 1998: 
1776). 
  
A treatment planning system (TPS) is used in conjunction with the CT to 
determine the delivery of the radiation dose to the patient. The TPS consists 
of three-dimensional imaging and software algorithms that require beam 
entry parameters for an exact match between calculated and measured 
data. This represents the radiation characteristics of the radiation treatment 
units that then give an accurate dose distribution of the planned radiation 
dose delivered to the patient (Kutcher et al., 1994: 583). The increased 
demand and introduction of additional devices and new radiation treatment 
procedures and techniques increases the complexity of the radiation 
therapy process and subsequently the potential for error (Klein, Drzymala, 
Purdy & Michaelski, 2005: 82). 
 
Accurately calibrated radiation treatment units, which match the TPS, 
together with treatment aids (e.g., bolus and shielding) and appropriate 
immobilisation devices are required to administer the planned radiation 
treatment in the planned radiation treatment position to the patient. A 
record-and-verify (RV) system, electronic portal imaging (EPI) and 
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verification imaging (VI), and in vivo dosimetry (IVD) are then used to verify 
the correct delivery of the radiation treatment (Kutcher et al., 1994: 584). 
Adequate quality control and assurance must be in place and committed to, 
to produce radiation treatment plans of the highest quality and to delivering 
them accurately and precisely. Only then will all the advances in the 
technology of radiation therapy translate into improvement in clinical results 
(Cox & Ang, 2003: 546).   
 
Maintaining complication rates within acceptable limits while delivering the 
highest possible tumour control rates, requires a very high accuracy of 
radiation therapy (Mijnheer et al., 2007: 408).  
 
2.5. ROLE OF THE RADIATION THERAPIST IN QUALITY PROCEDURES 
 
Radiation therapists are highly skilled professionals, qualified by education, 
with specific planning capabilities learnt on-the-job, to provide radiation 
therapy-related services under supervision of a radiation oncologist. They 
are responsible for radiation treatment planning and the accurate 
administration of the radiation treatment, prescribed by the radiation 
oncologist, through the utilisation of specialised radiation treatment 
apparatus. They have a major role to play in ensuring that accurate and 
appropriate planning and treatment techniques are used, and in developing 
and improving the practice of radiation therapy (Duggan, Kron, Howlett, 
Skov & O’Brien, 1997: 297) (Kutcher et al., 1994: 614). The role of the 
radiation therapist in the various radiation treatment sections is described. 
 
2.5.1. Pre-treatment Preparation 
Kutcher et al., (1994: 614) state, that the radiation therapist must 
understand treatment methods and protocols. S/he must coordinate the 
necessary procedures to initiate the radiation treatment planning process. 
The radiation therapist must utilize the data required from the CT and the 
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simulator to generate two-dimensional and three-dimensional isodose plans. 
Manual or computer generated dose calculations are also performed by the 
radiation therapist. S/he has to document and communicate all facets of the 
radiation treatment plan to the radiation therapy team at the radiation 
treatment unit and make sure the team has a copy of the plan (Fraass et al., 
1998: 1796).  
 
2.5.1.1. The Simulator 
The simulator is a specialised diagnostic X-ray unit where the patients are 
marked for their radiation treatment. The simulator ‘simulates’ the 
movements and geometry of the radiation treatment units. Patients are set-
up in the correct reproducible radiation treatment position, the radiation 
treatment is simulated and X-ray films are taken to visualise the anatomy 
included in the proposed radiation treatment area (Griffiths & Short, 1994: 
114). These films are then examined and if approved, prescribed by the 
oncologist. When the oncologist is satisfied with the treatment position and 
radiation treatment field of the patient the exact location of the field is 
anatomically marked on the patient with tattoos. Where the radiation field 
falls within sensitive noticeable areas like the patient’s face, the location of 
the field centre is given trough X, Y and Z axial coordinates. Offcord-
treatments, smaller fields and boosters are also marked and controlled with 
X-ray check films in the same manner as described above. 
 
If a patient receives a three-dimensional co-planar radiation treatment plan 
the isocentric treatment marks, used for referencing, are transferred onto 
the patient as stipulated by the radiation treatment planning unit. The exact 
radiation field arrangements are then set-up according to the radiation 
treatment plan and control X-ray films are taken to verify the accuracy of the 
radiation fields and as such the radiation treatment. During this process the 
patient’s separation and tattoo locations are also controlled.  
2.5.1.2. Radiation Treatment Planning 
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The three-dimensional co-planar radiation treatment plans are formulated 
on three-dimensional computer generated reconstructions of the patient at 
the radiation treatment planning unit. The radiation beams are positioned 
around the target volume and 3D beam’s-eye view volume dose displays 
are generated. The radiation beams are then repositioned and/or adjusted 
accordingly to deliver the required dose to the target volume while sparing 
the normal surrounding tissue and critical structures. The planning radiation 
therapist is responsible for the contouring of the patient and the critical 
structures, the design of the 3D treatment plan and all the technical data 
and documentation needed to execute the 3D treatment plan at the 
radiation treatment units (ACR 2006: 970). Radiation treatment dose 
distributions are also performed at the planning unit when a radiation 
treatment unit is out of order and the patient has to receive treatment on 
another radiation treatment unit. For patients with breast cancer dose 
distributions are done according to the information received from the 
simulator. 
 
2.5.2. Delivery of Radiation Therapy 
The radiation therapist must be able to deliver a planned course of radiation 
therapy utilising the necessary radiation treatment units, field sizes, gantry 
and collimator angles, monitor units, shielding, wedges and patient 
positioning. S/he must verify prescriptions, maintain daily treatment records 
of the patients and document technical details of the delivered treatment 
(Kutcher et al., 1994: 614).  
 
S/he must ensure the quality and uniformity of clinical patient data collected 
and verifies the consistency between the radiation treatment protocol and 
the radiation treatment delivery (Maciá, Rubio, De Blas, Monfa & Bonet, 
1993: 150). Faithfull & Wells (2004: 108) recommend that the clinical 
progress of the patient must be observed for any signs of complications and 
the radiation therapist must decide whether it is necessary to consult the 
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radiation oncologist responsible for the patient. This includes any adverse 
reactions to the radiation treatment or a progressive deterioration of the 
patients’ physical well-being. 
 
According to Kutcher et al., (1994: 614) as well as Duggan et al., (1997: 
297) the radiation therapist must be attentive to radiation treatment unit 
malfunctions and know the safety limits of the equipment operation. S/he 
must have a good understanding of the function and utilization of the 
equipment and all the radiation treatment accessories. 
 
2.5.2.1. Radiation Treatment Units 
 
The actual radiation treatment is delivered to the patient at the radiation 
treatment unit. After the patient has passed through the simulator and a 
radiation treatment plan has been configured the end-result is the radiation 
treatment itself. One radiation treatment consists of a pre-determined 
amount of fields as established during the treatment planning process. It 
can range from one to four or even twelve radiation fields per radiation 
treatment. The radiation therapists at the radiation treatment unit are the 
front-line operators responsible for the correct and accurate execution of the 
radiation treatment plan. The patient has to be positioned, the isocentric 
movements are to be done, any treatment accessories put into place and 
the numerous machine parameters set and controlled. All this has to be 
done with an exceptional degree of accuracy (Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) 1995: x).  
 
2.5.2.2. Brachytherapy 
The radiation therapist is responsible for obtaining the appropriate 
verification films at the correct angles to control the position of the sources 
in order to calculate the dose. S/he must assist in the preparation of the 
brachytherapy unit where the patient will be receiving the brachytherapy 
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treatment. S/he is responsible for the verification of the source dwell times 
and positions for each used treatment channel from the output planning 
data prior to the treatment as well as the administration of the treatment 
(Kutcher et al., 1994: 614).   
 
At the Oncotherapy Department at Universitas Annexe, Bloemfontein the 
brachytherapy procedures are performed at the simulator. This procedure 
requires a multi-disciplinary team consisting of an oncologist, an oncology 
nurse, two radiation therapists and a medical physicist. The procedure starts 
with the insertion of the brachytherapy applicators, the assessment of the 
applicator position through fluoroscopy, the required adjustments and 
stabilisation of the applicator position and the control X-ray films. The 
patient is then carefully moved to the afterloading suite. There the 
computation of the dose distribution is done to determine the source 
configurations. These configurations are then programmed into the 
afterloading system and controlled before treatment is commenced. The 
treatment details e.g. the source configurations, the total radiation dose 
received and the applicator types used are then documented in the patients’ 
treatment file (Griffiths & Short, 1994: 223). 
 
2.6. ACCURACY IN RADIATION THERAPY 
 
Radiation therapy should be administered accurately, meticulously and 
sensibly, as there is little chance to rectify a poorly planned or administered 
radiation treatment course. Once the radiation treatment has been 
delivered, it cannot be removed or erased. The planned radiation treatment 
should include all tumour-bearing tissues and prevent the unnecessary 
irradiation of normal tissues. This makes accuracy the primary quality and 
expected outcome of radiation therapy (Khan & Potish 1998: 37).  
 
Treatment preparation and delivery consist of localization, simulation, 
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dosimetry and treatment with a large number of parameters in each step. 
Every step and data transfer in the radiation treatment process is error 
prone and may produce erroneous data. This makes it a very complex and 
intricate process (Van Esh et al., 2000: 110). Errors will differ from 
department to department depending on the different equipment, methods 
and procedures used. Improved QC mechanisms need to be developed to 
maintain the superior quality of radiation therapy in the face of the growing 
complexity of the treatment processes (Valentin, 2000: 56). 
 
Correct dose calculations, accurate positioning and repositioning are 
needed to guarantee that the radiation therapy is repeatedly delivered in an 
optimal and accurate manner (Levitt, Khan & Potish, 1992: 16). The 
accurate positioning and execution of the fields comprises of field size, 
gantry and collimator angles, monitor units and the prescribed time as well 
as the perfect repositioning of the patient with the correct immobilisation 
devices (Peckham et al., 1995: 703). Numerous technical and physical 
factors can cause inaccurate definition of the target volume, inadequate 
treatment planning, unreliable and inconsistent patient positioning, incorrect 
administration of the dose and the incorrect use of the shielding, wedges, 
field sizes, gantry angle, collimation or bolus (Levitt et al., 1992: 16). 
 
It is easy to make mistakes in radiation therapy, and uniquely challenging. It 
is easy in the aspect that it is a routine procedure performed daily on 
computers, calculators and highly specialised equipment and no person can 
perform routine procedures daily for approximately 40 years without making 
one mistake. Radiation therapy mistakes are uniquely challenging because 
radiation therapy mistakes cannot be seen, heard, smelled, felt, tasted or 
erased (Leer et al., 1998: 9). 
 
 
Due to the many steps involved in delivering radiation dose to a target 
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volume the ICRU recommends that the radiation dose to the patient must be 
delivered with an accuracy much better than 5% to actually be within 5% of 
the prescribed dose (Kutcher et al., 1994: 584). Thus, it seems unlikely that 
each and every patient can be treated without an incident resulting in a 
deviation from the prescribed radiation treatment.  
 
2.7. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
 
The aim of QA is to assure that the performance of a product or a process 
will be within the prescribed stipulations (Peckham et al., 1995: 703) and 
that the desired goals are achieved and fall within the predefined standards 
(Thwaites et al., 1995: 63). It is an industrial concept that has been tailored 
and developed to suit the needs of the medical profession (Peckham et al., 
1995: 703).  
 
To ensure an accurate and effective treatment it is imperative that QA 
should be present and performed at all of the various steps, processes and 
levels of the radiation therapy course. To progress from the initial clinical 
decision to the actual radiation treatment delivery requires numerous 
interweaved stages and processes involving specialised equipment, 
procedures and staff groups. Radiation therapy is a multidisciplinary 
speciality with an intense need for applicable QA (Leer et al., 1998: 9). 
  
Mijnheer et al., (2007: 4010) found that the absence of or the incorrect 
application of QA programmes are responsible for most of the radiation 
therapy incidents. QA has long been present in the physical, technical, 
dosimetric and treatment delivery aspects of the radiation therapy process. 
There has been a growing need that QA should broaden its scope and 
include all aspects of the radiation therapy process in an all-embracing 
integrated approach (Leer et al., 1998: 9). This approach should be 
systematic where more formalised QC systems and QA programmes will be 
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necessary due to the ever-increasing complexity of techniques and the 
associated QA and QC procedures (Thwaites et al., 1995: 63). 
 
QA and risk management goes hand in hand. The probability of a planned 
objective not being obtained due to the failure of a specific action or system 
is referred to as risk. Risk can be detrimental to any activity with a precise 
planned outcome e.g. radiation therapy. The effort to minimize this risk is 
called risk management (Scalliet, 2006: 275). The incidence of low quality 
and high risk of errors are directly linked to the time and effort invested into 
QA. The results of a good quality program will improve immediately when 
more time and effort are invested into it. Risk management consists of four 
components: ‘identifying the possible sources of risk of failure or 
malfunction, analysing the frequency of incidents of failure or malfunction, 
taking corrective action to minimise such failure and monitoring the outcome 
of such changes’ (Khan & Potish, 1998: 140). Thus, by managing the risks 
effectively good quality is assured. 
 
2.8. QUALITY CONTROL SYSTEM 
 
A QC system describes the methods and procedures by which quality can 
be guaranteed and can be defined as the organisational structure and 
responsibilities necessary for implementing QA. A QC system provides a 
well-documented formal written scheme to ensure that all the key aspects of 
QA in the department are defined, documented, understood and put into 
practice (Leer et al., 1998: 9). All the necessary quality procedures are 
interlinked to facilitate in the communication and co-operation between the 
various staff groups and treatment process levels and to minimise 
uncertainty in responsibilities and tasks.  A QC system is actually a 
management system that enables the monitoring of the realization of the 
quality requirements in the radiation therapy practice in regards with the 
formal written system (Leer et al., 1998: 9). 
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According to Roth et al., (1998: 84) QC is a major component of QA and in 
the general quality improvement of radiation therapy. QC is an important 
tool in achieving the overall aim of QA, which is good quality radiation 
therapy and more importantly that good quality patient care are delivered. 
Patient treatment should be the main objective and incentive for a good 
quality system to function effectively (Leer et al., 1998: 10). 
 
Quality standards have to be in place and applied in the department before 
a quality control system can be implemented. If there are no quality 
standards in place, there is nothing to control and thus a quality control 
system would be futile. The goal of the quality control system is to ensure 
that the predefined standards are met. A good quality control system 
therefore requires good predefined standards regarding treatment methods, 
treatment protocols and treatment execution (Leer et al., 1998: 10). If no 
errors, mishaps or incidents are reported through the QC system it confirms 
the good and correct work performed by the staff. By giving satisfactory 
feedback and involving the staff in the QC system their motivation can be 
increased by commending them. The increased motivation is to the ultimate 
benefit of the patient because the staff will be more focused on their 
responsibilities (Roth et al., 1998: 87). 
 
Through the correct implementation of specified QC procedures, random 
and systematic incidents can be detected and prevented in future radiation 
therapy procedures, thus reducing the probability or the consequences of 
adverse incidents (Thwaites et al., 1995: 63). However, whilst the adoption 
of a QC system will indeed fulfil the role of reducing the frequency and effect 
of incidents, the more fundamental reason for following this approach of QC 
is to help to provide good quality radiation treatment to the patient (Leer et 
al., 1998: 13). The ultimate goal of radiation therapy is to improve the 
outcome of the radiation therapy and the overall quality of life for patients 
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living with cancer (Chen, Trotti, Coleman, Machtay, Mirimanoff, Hay, Chir, 
O’Brien, El-Gueddari, Salvajoli & Jeremic, 2006: 1449). 
 
2.9. ADVERSE INCIDENTS AND REPORTING 
 
When a radiation treatment is delivered and it deviates from the prescribed 
radiation treatment prescription, due to either unit treatment malfunction or 
human error, it can be referred to as an adverse radiation incident (Swann-
D’Emilia, Chu & Daywalt, 1990: 185).  
 
As discussed in 2.6., the ICRU recommends that the radiation dose 
delivered to the patient should be within 5% of the prescribed total radiation 
dose (Kutcher et al., 1994: 584). If an incident occurs that causes a 
deviation from the prescribed radiation dose it can be referred to as an 
adverse incident. An adverse incident with a deviation of less than 5% from 
the prescribed radiation treatment protocol still falls within tolerance and 
acceptable limits, as recommended by the ICRU and are referred to as a 
minor adverse incidents. A deviation of more than 5% from the prescribed 
radiation treatment is referred to as a major adverse incident (Kutcher et al., 
1994: 584).  Duggan et al., (1997: 300) also state that the probability of local 
tumour control can significantly decrease and the complication rate 
associated with radiation therapy can be significantly increased with 
variations greater than 5% from the prescribed radiation treatment.   
 
Any stage of the radiation process and/or any staff group may be 
responsible for the occurrence of an adverse incident. Critical areas are 
crossing points between the various staff groups and different stages of the 
process where good communication and the correct transfer of data are 
imperative to the success of the radiation therapy process. General human 
causes of adverse incidents include ‘complacency, inattention, lack of 
knowledge, over-confidence, pressure on time, lack of resources and failure 
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in communication (Mijnheer et al., 2007: 413). Williams (2006: 1) adds that 
a lack in checking procedures, failure to update written working practices 
and a lack of training in the specific field can increase the incidence of 
adverse effects. 
 
Different researchers used different categories for incident reporting. 
Swann-D’Emilia et al., (1990: 186) categorise adverse incidents into 
categories to aid in the examination of the accumulated data. These 
categories of adverse incidents can be defined as treatment unit 
malfunctions; calculation errors and treatment delivery errors. Treatment 
unit malfunction is when a deviation from the prescribed radiation dose 
occurs due to a malfunction of the radiation treatment unit.  Calculation error 
is a mistake made during the monitor unit calculations or any error on the 
isodose plan that leads to a deviation from the prescribed radiation dose. 
Treatment delivery errors are any incorrect action that occurs during the 
delivery of the radiation treatment and includes incorrect use of the 
shielding, multi-leaf collimators, wedges, field sizes, gantry angle, 
collimation, bolus or calculated monitor units. Block fabrication errors are 
any inappropriate use of shielding due to incorrect block mounting and/or 
labelling. Calandrino et al., (1997: 272) uses geometrical parameters, 
energy, block fabrication, data entry, normalization, wedge and tray factor 
as incident categories. Patton et al., (2003: 51) categorised the incidents 
according to incorrect patient identification, incorrect data field, incorrect site 
and incorrect beam modifications and Yeung et al., (2005: 287) classified 
the source of error as: documentation, absolute dose calibration, treatment 
planning, patient set-up, patient data management system, 
machine/accessories fault and miscellaneous. The categories described by 
Swann-D’Emilia et al., (1990: 186) were initially used in the current study, 
but as the study progressed, the need for additional categories arose (See 
Section 3.2.2.). 
If a well-designed QC program, with adequate layers of safety is in place 
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and applied correctly, it will hamper the development of an adverse incident 
from the original erroneous event (Leer et al., 1998: 74).  
  
According to Patton, Gaffney & Moeller (2003: 51) any adverse incidents 
should be documented on a technical error reporting form. These forms can 
then be reviewed immediately or periodically. Immediate review is done for 
corrective action needed during the radiation therapy treatment course. 
Periodic reviews of the error report forms are done to assess the overall 
operations and procedures, to track trends, provide feedback, educate and 
advocate necessary modifications of policies and procedures to create an 
environment which allows for general system improvements. Dunn (2003: 
52) also suggests that incident-reporting systems can be used to analyze 
the data collected, interpret it and convey it among the concerned staff 
groups to lead to an improved quality system that can identify methods to 
prevent future incidents from occurring. If the reports are not analysed and 
followed-up it can weaken support for constructive response in future. 
 
Huang, Medlam, Lee, Billingsley, Bissonnette, Ringash, Kane & Hodgson 
(2005: 1591) used an incident report form in their study that included the 
patient’s name, diagnosis, attending doctor, time in radiation treatment 
course, place of treatment and reporting therapist. Recommendations on 
corrective actions were done by a senior radiation therapist and a physicist, 
as well as methods to avoid such errors in the future. The clinical 
significance of the error was indicated by the attending radiation oncologist 
as none, minor, moderate, or severe, with no standard definition of these 
severity grades. 
 
 
 
 
2.10. QUALITY CONTROL PROCEDURE MANUAL 
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The accurate completion of a radiation treatment prescription through the 
correct implementation of radiation therapy techniques, methods and 
apparatus is the ultimate goal of QA and QC. Through efficient QA and QC 
procedures, uncertainties in radiation therapy can be quantified to reduce 
the risk of incidents linked to radiation treatment equipment, acquisition of 
anatomical data, the design of the radiation treatment plan and the actual 
delivery of the radiation treatment (Aletti, Bey, Chauvel, Chavaudra, Costa, 
Donnareix, Gaboriaud, Lagrange, Manny, Ponvert, Rozan, Valinta & Van 
Dam, 1995: 9). 
 
The study of incidents to determine the origin and cause is an effective tool 
to determine whether a QC system was in place. It is also useful in 
illustrating the role of QC systems in reducing the probability of incidents 
(Leer et al., 1998: 12). Efficient checking procedures can detect adverse 
incidents before or during radiation therapy. An adverse incident reporting 
system that forms part of the QC procedure manual can assist in the 
evaluation of QC systems to determine whether it is up to standard (Yeung, 
Bortolotto, Cosby, Hoar & Lederer, 2005: 283). Huang et al., (2005: 1591) 
state that random and systemic errors can be detected by the 
implementation of good QC protocols. Leer et al., (1998: 13), states that the 
absence of a QC system, which expects mistakes to be made, contributes 
to the origin of incidents. Future incidents can thus be prevented or 
minimised by the investigation of past incidents.  
 
A lack of adequate checking procedures during dose calculations and data 
transfers can lead to serious systematic errors eluding the system and 
cause initiating events to progress into actual adverse incidents (Fiorino, 
Corletto, Mangili, Broggi, Bonini, Cattaneo, Parisi, Rosso, Signorotto, Villa & 
Calandrino, 2000: 95). A systematic evaluation of the existing QC systems 
should be done to determine the areas that need improvement. This quality 
 34 
audit can lead to modifications of the quality systems which results in top 
quality radiation therapy procedures (Leer et al., 1998: 74). 
 
Bradby (199-: 2) indicates that a QC procedure manual is intended to be 
used as a facilitation tool to monitor and evaluate the radiation therapy 
process. It can also be used as a tool to improve the quality and 
appropriateness of radiation oncology care. It sets mechanisms into place 
for identifying mistakes before they affect the patients’ radiation treatment 
(Huang et al., 2005: 1591). All employees of a radiation oncology 
department are responsible for the implementation of a QC plan (Bradby, 
199-: 2). It is important to keep in mind that quality should be part of 
everyday management. Unfortunately, there can never be a single ideal 
solution because quality issues are not an exact science (Kehoe & Rugg, 
1999: 282). 
 
According to Bradby (199-: 2) the aim of a QC procedure manual is to 
identify ways of improving the effectiveness of radiation therapy by means 
of a methodical approach to the radiation therapy process through which 
problems regarding the radiation therapy can be identified, communicated 
and effectively resolved. Effective systems should be developed for the 
objective evaluation of the efficiency, safety and accuracy of the radiation 
therapy. Through this, the risk to benefit relationship for patients receiving 
radiation therapy can be optimised. 
 
Taking into account particular quality issues, the QC procedure manual can 
provide a framework and pre-defined structure for QA procedures, tasks 
and required documentation regarding radiation therapists. It can aid in the 
safe, efficient and accurate implementation of changes in radiation 
treatment techniques and protocols (Leer et al., 1998: 10). Mijnheer et al., 
(2007: 414) state that human error will always occur in any organisation and 
in any activity but that the existence of a comprehensive, systematic and 
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consistently applied QA programme will minimize the number of incidents 
and identify them at the earliest possible opportunity. 
 
The QC procedure manual can ensure that the responsibilities of the 
radiation therapist are clearly defined and that newly recruited personnel or 
students are directed towards relevant procedures and work instructions 
and will aid in their introduction to a new environment (Leer et al., 1998: 10).  
Thus, a QC procedure manual can offer insurance that the patients receive 
the intended radiation therapy and that the likelihood of an incident is 
miniscule.  
 
2.11. RELATED STUDIES 
 
Several searches e.g. literature searches, internet searches and Nexus 
searches, were performed to locate related published studies. There is an 
abundance of literature information of general QA in radiation therapy and 
QA specially aimed at radiation physics and physicists. Very few related 
published studies specifically on the analysis of incidents during radiation 
therapy of cancer patients were found.  
 
Patton et al., (2003: 50) also state that there are many publications with 
extensive literature under the general label of radiation therapy errors but 
unfortunately it is usually on the subject of patient set-up and reproducibility. 
This includes patient positioning, organ motion, set-up error and radiation 
dose determination. Reports addressing radiation therapy treatment 
mistakes or incidents which include data transfer errors, incorrect patient, 
incorrect radiation energy, incorrect shielding and treatment unit malfunction 
are relatively few. These will be discussed next. 
 
 
In a study about the detection of systematic errors in external radiation 
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therapy before treatment delivery, performed by Calandrino, Cattaneo, 
Fiorino, Longobardi, Mangili & Signorotto (1997: 272) over a period of 61 
months, from September 1991 to November 1996, in Milan a total of 217 
errors were detected. This gives an average of 3.6 errors detected per 
month. 
 
Swann-D’Emilia et al., (1990: 187) performed a study on the 
misadministrations of prescribed radiation dose over a period of 24 months 
from 1988 to 1989 at the Fox Chase Cancer Centre, Philadelphia. In the first 
12 months a total of 54 misadministrations occurred, averaging four per 
month. In the last 12 months a total of 33 misadministrations occurred with 
an average of three per month. 
 
Williams, Bradnam, McCurrah, Deehan & Johnston (1991: 200) performed a 
quality audit at Beatson Oncology Centre, Belvidere Hospital, Glasgow, 
from December 1987 to July 1989 but due to program revisions during the 
study the last nine months of the study were used for the actual results. 
They recorded a total of 28 genuine errors during this nine month period. 
They were presented with a total of 14 incidents with a deviation of 5% or 
more from the prescribed radiation treatment.  
 
Huang et al., (2005: 1593) performed a study at Princess Margaret Hospital 
in Canada from January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2002 where the 
errors in the delivery of radiation therapy were analysed retrospectively. 
During the study period, there were 28 136 patient treatments delivered to a 
total of 43,302 treatment regions. There were 555 treatments with detected 
treatment errors. From July 1, 2000, through December 31, 2002, there 
were 241 187 fractions delivered, 711 with errors. 
 
Patton et al., (2003: 51) performed a study at the Department of Radiation 
Oncology at the University of Utah between July 1, 1999 and June 30, 2000. 
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During this study period a total of 22 542 external beam radiation therapy 
treatments were performed and 67 339 fields were treated and 38 technical 
error reporting forms were submitted. These technical error reporting forms 
were reviewed for a crude radiation therapy error rate of 0.17% of patient 
treatments administered during this 12-month period. A treatment error was 
documented in 3.3% of the 1 163 radiation therapy courses administered 
during this period.  
 
According to Yeung et al., (2005: 287) 13 385 patients have undergone 
radiation treatment at the Northeastern Ontario Regional Cancer Centre 
between November 1992 and December 2002. Over this period of time, 624 
incidents were reported. The majority of the incidents (42.1%) were related 
to errors in ‘documentation’ and most of these could be attributed to ‘error in 
data transfer’ or ‘inadequate communication’. ‘Patient set-up error’ 
accounted for 40.4% of the incidents and about half of these errors were 
related to shielding. Errors in ‘treatment planning’ accounted for 13.0% of 
the incidents. A more in depth discussion will be given in Chapter 5.  
 
2.12. CONCLUSION 
 
When a patient is treated with curative intent, radiation therapy is a very 
effective method to destroy the tumour in the treatment volume. The 
maximum radiation dose to the target has to be delivered with minimum 
damage to the normal surrounding soft tissue in order for the radiation 
treatment to be successful and to achieve the highest possible local and / or 
distant tumour control with the minimum amount of side affects (Van Esh et 
al., 2000: 109). Effective radiation therapy strives for a cure of the tumour 
and thus the lengthening of a patients’ life together with an acceptable 
quality of life (Chen et al., 2006: 1449).   
Accurate radiation treatment delivery is an absolute necessity for effective 
radiation therapy. The assessment of the standard of the QC system and 
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the frequency and origin of incidents during radiation therapy as well as the 
design of a QC procedure manual can result in more effective and 
advanced quality treatment. The objective of this QC procedure manual is to 
facilitate in the monitoring, evaluating, and improvement of the quality of 
radiation oncology care. 
 
In Chapter 3, the research methodology of the study will be discussed. 
Perspective will be gained in the implementation of the study and the 
acquisition of the results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Basic dosimetry, treatment unit parameters, delineation of the target 
volumes, planning and calculation methods, the daily set-up of the patients 
and all the other numerous steps involved in the preparation and execution 
of radiation therapy can play a role in the risk involved of delivering a 
absorbed radiation dose to the patient (Van der Schueren, Horiot, Leunens, 
Rubens, Steward, Van Dongen, Van Oosterom & Vanongelen, 1993: 177). 
Chapter Three presents an in depth look at the steps involved in the 
execution of the present study and in attaining the research objectives.  
 
The research objectives of the study were: to determine the origin and 
frequency of adverse incidents leading to inaccurate delivery of radiation 
therapy to patients at the department; to classify these adverse incidents as 
major or minor adverse incidents; to compare these results with other 
radiation therapy centres that have published information on the prevalence 
of adverse incidents in radiation therapy delivery; and to develop a quality 
control procedure manual that will focus on the responsibility of radiation 
therapists in quality assurance procedures.  
 
This chapter will be reviewing the procedures followed to establish the 
adverse incidents and to compile a quality control procedure manual 
designed for radiation therapists at the department. This will include the 
research design, adverse incidents report forms, adverse incidents, data 
collection and processing, statistical analysis, preliminary investigations and 
the design of the quality control procedure manual. 
 
The study consisted of three main parts. The first part was the accumulation 
of raw data by means of the adverse incident report forms. This part of the 
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study was quantitive in nature as it was the objective part of the study where 
the facts were calculable, quantifiable and unprejudiced. Numbers and 
statistics are used as the collection method for the data and a cause-and-
effect correlation could be made (Neill, 2007).  
The second part of the study was the meetings that were held and the 
information gathered from the opinions of the radiation therapists. This part 
of the research was qualitative in nature. It uses very different processes of 
gathering information that is much more subjective and e.g. focus groups 
and the researcher was the ‘data-gathering instrument’. It is probing, 
unrestricted and non-structured and it involves the investigation of data such 
as words and statements (Neill, 2007). 
In the third part of the study the processed data from the first two parts of 
the study came together to ultimately give rise to the quality control 
procedure manual. The quantitive and qualitative research were combined 
with the information obtained from the literature study to produce this 
manual specifically designed for this department. 
 
3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
From January 2007 to the end of June 2007, a clinical audit was performed 
at the department to establish the prevalence of adverse incidents during 
radiation therapy. For this period of six months, any adverse incidents 
occurring during the radiation therapy of a patient at Universitas Annexe 
were strictly monitored.  
 
A meeting was held in January 2007, where the reasons for the reporting of 
adverse incidents and the method of reporting the adverse incidents were 
explained to the radiation therapists. The personnel involved were informed 
that the data collected from the adverse incident reports could be used in an 
effort to identify and decrease the possibility of adverse incidents such as 
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those reported during the preliminary investigation (3.2.6). By doing so, the 
existing quality levels of the delivery of radiation treatment at the department 
can be addressed and where necessary, improved. 
 
During the period of the study the department consisted of  
 Two simulators (Philips Radiotherapy Systems Simulator, 1987) – 
these are used for the marking of the patients, where the treatment 
position and fields of the radiation therapy are simulated and 
recorded on X-ray film. 
 One Cadplan planning unit (Varian Oncology Systems CadPlan, 
1999) – used to do the three-dimensional conformal planning of the 
planned target volumes. 
 Four linear accelerators: Elekta SL75-14 (Philips Radiotherapy 
Systems SL75-14, 1986); Elekta SL75-5 (Philips Radiotherapy 
Systems SL75-5, 1988); Elekta SL25 (Elekta Limited SL25, 2003) 
and Elekta Precise (Elekta Limited, 2003) – responsible for the actual 
radiation treatment delivery to the patients. 
 One Philips orthovoltage unit – used for the treatment of superficial 
lesions (Philips Radiotherapy Systems RT 250 (III), 1982). 
 One afterloading high dose rate brachytherapy system (Nucletron 
M/HDR afterloader Ir192). 
 One afterloading low dose rate system (Nucletron LDR selectron 
Cs137) – used for brachytherapy. 
 One workshop and plastic laboratory – this is where all additional 
apparatus, leadshielding and bolus are made that are used during 
the treatment of the patient. 
 
 
 
Due the to the malfunctioning of the Computerised Tomography (Somatom 
Hi-Q) unit – responsible for CT scan images, the patients were scanned at 
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Universitas Hospital X-ray Department and the data transferred to the 
planning units. 
 
At the time of the study the above mentioned treatment units were operated 
by 23 qualified radiation therapists, seven student radiation therapists, three 
laboratory technicians, four permanent medical physicists, six medical 
physics students and one engineer in the department. According to the 
departmental report, an average of 130 patients receives radiation therapy 
in this department every workday from Monday to Friday. All of these units 
and personnel were either directly or indirectly involved in the study. 
 
3.2.1. Adverse Incident Report Form 
An adverse incident report form (See Appendix 2) was designed, by utilising 
literature references and departmental experience, to capture the 
information required for reporting the adverse incident and for corrective 
actions. From the discussion in 2.9., it is evident that there is a variety of 
different categories for incident reporting which are used by different 
researchers. Calandrino et al., (1997: 272), Patton et al., (2003: 51), Yeung 
et al., (2005: 287) and Swann-D’Emilia et al., (1990: 186) all use a different 
categories of adverse incidents for reporting. 
 
Upon discovery of an adverse incident, the radiation therapist in charge of 
the unit completed the adverse incident report form. The radiation therapist 
in charge was allocated for this task to minimise the ‘blame-effect’. It was 
felt that if the person at fault were forced to complete the adverse incident 
report forms the subject would become to sensitive and the reported 
adverse incidents would not be a true reflection of the actual adverse 
incidents. The date, treatment machine, details of the patients’ treatment 
plan, and where in the treatment regime the patient was at the moment of 
the discovery of the adverse incident, were completed. 
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A detailed description of the adverse incident was given with a reason for 
the occurrence of the adverse incident. If there were any corrective steps to 
be taken, it was also explained on the form. Any preventative steps that 
were being taken to prevent a similar adverse incident from occurring were 
verbalised on the report. The adverse incident was reported to the 
oncologist in charge of the radiation treatment of the patient. The oncologist 
and the reporting radiation therapist both had to sign the report (See 
Appendix 2).  
 
3.2.2. Adverse Incidents 
Initially the adverse incident categories recommended by Swann-D’Emilia et 
al., (1990: 187) were used for the current study and included any event that 
resulted in a deviation from the prescribed treatment and were categorised 
as: 
 Errors in dose calculations; 
 The use of shielding, wedges, field sizes, gantry angle collimation or 
bolus that is inconsistent with the prescribed radiation treatment; 
 Incorrect patient positioning; 
 Any treatment unit malfunctioning during treatment that results in a 
deviation from the prescribed dose. 
 
However, during the course of the study it became apparent that the present 
study required additional categories for the classification of the reported 
adverse incidents. Thus, the categories suggested by Swann-D’Emilia et al., 
(1990: 187) was used in combination with categories described by Patton et 
al., (2003: 51) and customized according to the needs of the current study.  
 
 
 
The reported adverse incidents were categorised as:  
 data transfer error (DTE) 
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 dose calculation error (DCE); 
 incorrect field positioning (FP); 
 incorrect patient (IP); 
 incorrect patient positioning (PP); 
 incorrect radiation energy (RE); 
 incorrect shielding (IS); 
 treatment unit malfunction (TUM). 
 
These classifications were determined by the type of adverse incidents that 
were reported during the current study. 
 
3.2.3. Data Collection 
The radiation therapist in charge of the unit filed the adverse incident reports 
at the treatment units where the researcher collected the forms weekly. The 
adverse incidents were recorded on data forms (See Appendix 3). In 
cooperation and consultation with a medical physicist, the magnitude of the 
adverse incident was determined and the adverse incidents were then 
divided into major and minor categories accordingly.  
 
Because the frequency of the monthly meetings was determined by the 
available time permitted by the workload, the planned monthly meetings 
were held every second month (see numbering of minutes in Table 3.1). 
Thus, a discussion, with all personnel involved, was held every second 
month, where the adverse incident, the origin and preventative steps was 
discussed. At these discussions, all the radiation therapists present had the 
opportunity to air their opinions and make recommendations on any 
corrective actions that could be taken. Minutes of the meetings were kept by 
the researcher as well as an appointed minutes keeper. These minutes 
were kept as qualitative data for future referencing, the construction of the 
quality control procedure manual and to support the study. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of meetings 
Meeting No Date Main Discussion Points 
1/2007 7 March 2007 Reported adverse incidents 
Opinions 
Preventative steps 
2/2007 9 May 2007 Reported adverse incidents 
Opinions 
Preventative steps 
3/2007 4 July 2007 Reported adverse incidents 
Opinions 
Preventative steps 
 
 
3.2.4. Data Processing and Statistical Analysis 
After collection of the adverse incident report forms from the radiation 
treatment units, the details of the adverse incidents were thoroughly studied. 
The degree of deviation of the adverse incident was determined by 
calculating the difference between the planned prescribed radiation 
treatment and the radiation treatment actually given. The expertise of a 
medical physicist was obtained for these calculations. 
  
After the calculations were made, the adverse incidents were categorised as 
major or minor according to the ICRU guidelines (Kutcher et al., 1994: 584). 
The importance of an individual adverse incident was determined by the 
deviation from the prescribed dose. Any deviations of less than 5% from the 
prescribed radiation treatment dose was classified as minor adverse 
incidents while deviations of more than 5% from the prescribed radiation 
treatment dose was classified as major adverse incidents. The type of 
adverse incident and the extent of the adverse incident were then 
meticulously documented on the data forms (See Appendix 3). The adverse 
incident rate was calculated as one incident report form equal to one 
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incident with the totality of the incident used for the calculation of the 
deviation from the prescribed radiation treatment dose e.g. three fractions 
treatment with a 0.2Gy deviation equals 1 incident with a 0.6Gy deviation 
from the prescribed radiation treatment dose. All of the information above as 
well as a summarised version of the adverse incident report forms were 
used in the presentation and discussion of the results during the meetings 
that were held.  
 
At the end of the period of the study (June 2007), the completed data forms 
were reviewed. A quantitative analysis was done by taking into 
consideration the number of adverse incidents reported, the number of 
adverse incidents reported in the various categories and the extent of the 
reported adverse incidents. This was done to determine the frequency of the 
reported adverse incidents and their manifestation in the different 
categories. The results obtained from this study were compared with other 
centres that have published results related to this field. 
  
Following the analysis of the reported adverse incident forms and the data 
forms, tables and graphs were prepared for the presentation of the data. 
Frequency distribution tables were used to demonstrate the number of 
observed reported adverse incidents falling into each adverse incident 
category. The data’s trends and relationships were revealed by utilising 
tables and graphic presentations. This demonstrated the data’s general 
structure more clearly as well as their proportional relationship to other 
centres that have published articles in this field (Lues 2002: 20). 
 
3.2.5. Preliminary Investigation 
As discussed in Chapter 1, a preliminary investigation was done over a 
period of eight months in 2005 to determine whether an extensive 
investigation was feasible. The efficiency of the adverse incident report 
forms was also established. During these eight months 1 965 patients were 
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treated with 55 571 radiation fields in 17 868 treatments. A total of 24 
adverse incidents were reported. The adverse incidents reported during the 
preliminary investigation are demonstrated in Table 3.2. according to the 
different categories. As demonstrated in Figure 3.1 it is evident that no 
correlation could be found between the number of treatments and the 
reported adverse incidents. 
 
Table 3.2 Adverse incidents reported during preliminary investigation 
                
2005 Dose Energy Field 
size 
Shielding Incorrect 
Field 
Other Total 
February  1 0 0 0 2 0 3 
March 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
April 1 1 1 0 1 1 5 
May 2 0 1 0 0 2 5 
June 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
July 0 2 2 1 0 0 5 
August 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
September 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
TOTAL 4 3 5 2 6 4 24 
 
 
The results obtained from the preliminary investigation illustrated that a 
more extensive investigation was justified and will be welcomed at the 
department. It was also evident from the preliminary investigation and 
feedback that the original adverse incident report forms needed some 
adjustments. These adjustments required the adverse incident report forms 
to be more user-friendly and to generate more effective reporting. 
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Preliminary Results
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Figure 3.1 Preliminary study results 
 
3.3. QUALITY CONTROL PROCEDURE MANUAL 
 
A quality control system can be defined as the organisational structure, 
responsibilities, procedures, processes and resources for implementing 
quality assurance. The general aim of developing a quality control 
procedure manual is to provide a formal written scheme of the quality 
system to ensure that all-important aspects of quality control in the 
department are defined, documented, understood and put into practice 
(Leer et al., 1998: 7). 
 
3.3.1. Investigation 
From January 2007 to end of June 2007 a quality audit of the existing 
quality control system and the responsibility of radiation therapists in quality 
assurance procedures, at the department, were done. The quality audit was 
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performed to identify deviations of quality activities from the planned 
arrangements and to initiate corrective actions in the event of deviations 
being observed (Leer et al., 1998: 74).  
 
Leer et al., (1998: 74) state that the objective of a quality audit is to 
formulate QC procedures that are designed to minimise the occurrence and 
consequences of any events, which could potentially affect the quality of 
patients’ radiation treatment. These QC procedures are then included in the 
quality control procedure manual designed for the radiation therapists. 
 
An assessment of all the quality control protocols, applicable to radiation 
therapists, regarding the radiation treatment machines, the planning 
systems, dose calculations, radiation treatment files and the actual radiation 
treatment was done. This assessment was done by making use of the 
guidelines given by the AAPM Radiation Therapy Committee Task Group 40 
in their report of Comprehensive Quality Assurance for Radiation Oncology 
(Kutcher et al., 1994: 583-615).  
 
These guidelines assisted in the evaluation of the identification of the 
patient, identification of the treatment target site ('localization'), radiation 
treatment planning process, simulation of the treatment and placement of 
body marks (tattoos), the positioning and immobilization during simulation 
and treatment, data acquisition, contouring, two-dimensional and three-
dimensional radiation treatment planning, the radiation treatment 
prescription, data transfer, the use of correct field sizes, the plan evaluation 
and computation of monitor units. As well as the use of beam modifiers, 
plan implementation, QC for individual patients, the radiation treatment plan 
review, monitor unit calculation review, radiation treatment plan 
implementation of the first treatment session, the in vivo dosimetry, daily 
patient positioning and selection of parameters and treatment accessories, 
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accumulation of doses in the patient's chart and modifications during the 
course of treatment at the department.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
3.3.2. Adverse Incidents 
As described by Khan & Potish (1998: 140) in section 2.7 risk management 
is closely associated with quality assurance. Risk management is achieved 
by identifying the possible sources of risk for adverse incidents; analysing 
the frequency of adverse incidents; taking corrective action to minimise such 
adverse incidents and by monitoring the outcome of such actions.  
 
Thus, the adverse incident report forms were examined and meticulously 
reviewed to establish the prevalence and nature of the adverse incidents 
occurring during the radiation treatment of patients. From this it could be 
established which adverse incidents were more common and the reasons 
for this occurrence.  
 
During the meetings, the reported adverse incidents were discussed. The 
distribution of the adverse incidents, possible reasons as well as any 
corrective actions and preventative steps that were to be taken were 
deliberated. The information obtained from these meetings was employed in 
the creation of the quality control procedure manual. It enabled the 
researcher to gain insight in the problematic areas of the existing quality 
system of the department and incorporate it into the quality control 
procedure manual. 
 
3.3.3. Contents 
From the information obtained from literature, together with the data 
gathered during the quality audit and the clinical audit of the adverse 
incidents, a written quality control procedure manual was developed. This 
QC procedure manual details and formalises the quality procedures, their 
frequency, the action criteria and records, and the responsibility of the 
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radiation therapists to perform them in the radiation treatment department at 
Universitas Annexe, Bloemfontein. 
  
Once implemented this quality control procedure manual should provide the 
department with an effective method of reporting adverse incidents and with 
ways of improving radiation treatment delivery with the minimum number of 
adverse incidents. It has the potential to facilitate superior radiation 
treatment delivery at the. 
 
3.4. CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter 3 presented a multifaceted look at the implementation of the study. 
All the steps involved in achieving the research objectives were reviewed 
and discussed. This included the clinical audit, the layout of the department, 
adverse incidents report forms, adverse incidents, data collection and 
processing, statistical analysis, preliminary investigations and the design of 
the quality control procedure manual. 
 
In Chapter 4 the findings of the study will be presented. A qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the reported and documented adverse incidents will 
be provided. Frequency distribution tables and graphic presentations were 
used to demonstrate the results of the quantitive and qualitative analysis of 
the study as well as a comparison with other published related studies.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
From January 2007 until the end of June 2007 (here after referred to as 
duration of the current study) 1 093 patients received radiation treatment at 
the Radiation Department of Universitas Annexe, Bloemfontein. These 
radiation treatments ranged from straightforward opposing field treatments 
for palliation to complex multiple field radiation treatment plans with MCPs, 
multi-leaf collimators (MLC) and motorised wedges for radical treatment. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1 the objectives of this study were: to determine 
the origin and frequency of adverse incidents leading to the inaccurate 
delivery of radiation therapy to patients at the department; to classify these 
adverse incidents as major or minor adverse incidents; to compare the 
results of the study with other radiation therapy centres that have published 
information on the prevalence of adverse incidents in radiation therapy 
delivery and to develop a quality control procedure manual that will focus on 
the responsibility of radiation therapists in quality control procedures at the 
department. 
 
Chapter 4 will include the presentation of the results as well as a short 
description of each of the units to demonstrate the type of tasks performed. 
Qualitative and quantitative analyses of the reported and documented 
adverse incidents were done. Frequency distribution tables and graphic 
presentations were used to demonstrate the results, the data’s general 
structure and to reveal trends and relationships of the reported adverse 
incidents. The quality control procedure manual will be presented and 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
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4.2. THE SIMULATOR 
 
During the current study a total of 1 918 patients traversed through the 
simulator. Brachytherapy treatments were given to 417 patients during this 
period and 1 920 X-ray check films were taken (Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1. Simulator productivity from January – June 2007.  
 
During January 2007 the largest number of patients (365) passed through 
the simulator and the highest number of X-ray films (451) was taken. 
February reported the highest number of brachytherapy treatments 
performed. The lowest number of patients (233) and X-ray films (203) were 
recorded in April 2007 and just 25 brachytherapy treatments were 
performed in January 2007 (figure 4.1). 
 
4.3. THE RADIATION TREATMENT PLANNING UNIT 
 
During the period of the study 160 contours were done, 137 distributions 
were calculated and 250 three-dimensional radiation treatment plans were 
drawn up. January had the highest total of distributions, contours and 3D 
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plans that added up to 124. May showed the least amount with 82. This low 
number is due to the fact that the CADPLAN was out of commission during 
the last week of May. Figure 4.2 illustrates the monthly distribution of the 
generated radiation treatment plans and distributions.  
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Figure 4.2.  Planning unit productivity from January – June 2007. 
  
4.4. RADIATION TREATMENT UNITS 
 
For the duration of the current study a total of 1 093 patients received 
radiation treatment on the various radiation treatment units. The number of 
radiation treatments added up to 11 466, consisting of 37 036 radiation 
treatment fields. One individual radiation treatment can vary from one 
single orthovoltage radiation treatment field, for superficial skin lesions, to 
two opposing megavoltage radiation treatment fields, for the palliative 
patients, to anything up to nine radiation treatment fields, for the radical 
patients with more complex radiation treatment plans. Figure 4.3 illustrates 
the monthly distribution of the radiation treatment fields given during this 
period. It is clearly demonstrated that during February the number of 
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radiation fields were the highest and during January and April they were 
the lowest.  
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Figure 4.3 Radiation treatment fields delivered from January – June 
2007. 
 
With the examination of Figure 4.4 it can be seen that the radiation 
treatments delivered, exhibits the same trend as the radiation treatment 
fields delivered, during the period of the study. 
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Figure 4.4 Radiation treatments delivered from January – June 2007.  
 
The monthly distribution of the patients that received radiation treatment at 
Universitas Annexe, Bloemfontein during the study period corresponds with 
the trends observed in Figures 4.3 – 4.6 regarding the radiation treatment 
fields and the radiation treatments delivered (Figure 4.5), with February and 
June having the highest radiation treatment activities. 
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Figure 4.5 Number of patients that received radiation treatment from 
January – June 2007. 
 
4.5. PERSONNEL  
 
During the period of the study an average of 23 radiation therapists were 
operational in the department. These 23 radiation therapists had to operate 
the four linear accelerators, the two simulation units, the planning unit, the 
orthovoltage unit and the CT unit. Figure 4.6 illustrates the distribution of the 
personnel on the different sub-categories of the department from January 
2007 to June 2007. February had the highest number with 27 staff members 
performing duties and June the least with 19 staff members. January and 
February had the least amount of personnel on leave or sick leave with only 
seven people taking leave during this month. From March to June, an 
average of 15 staff members was off-duty during each month. 
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Figure 4.6 Radiation therapists performing duties from January – June 
2007. 
 
4.6. DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTED ADVERSE INCIDENTS 
 
During the study and with the accumulation of the data it became apparent 
that the present study required additional categories to these suggested by 
Swann-D’Emilia et al., (1990: 187) for the classification of the reported 
adverse incidents. The reported adverse incidents were categorised as:  
 
 data transfer error (DTE) 
 dose calculation error (DCE); 
 incorrect field positioning (FP); 
 incorrect patient (IP); 
 incorrect patient positioning (PP); 
 incorrect radiation energy (RE); 
 incorrect shielding (IS); 
 treatment unit malfunction (TUM). 
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A total of 15 minor adverse incidents were reported. The monthly 
distribution of the reported adverse incidents during the period of the study 
manifested itself as follows (Figure 4.7): January 2 minor adverse incidents 
were reported; February 1 minor adverse incident reported; 2 minor adverse 
incidents were reported in March; April presented 4 reported minor adverse 
incidents; in May 1 minor adverse incident were reported and June had the 
highest reported number with 5 minor adverse incidents.  
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Figure 4.7 Reported adverse incidents during radiation therapy during 
January – June 2007.  
 
Of the total of 15 reported adverse incidents, 5 were due to errors in dose 
calculations. Data transfer errors, error in field positioning and incorrect 
shielding contributed 2 of the total reported adverse incidents each. 
Treatment unit malfunction, incorrect radiation treatment energy, incorrect 
patient positioning and the incorrect patient each represented 1 of the 
reported adverse incidents (Figure 4.8).   
Figure 4.8 provides a detailed illustration of the distribution of the reported 
adverse incidents in the various categories. From the total of 15 reported 
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adverse incidents it was possible to rectify 60% of them. It was not workable 
to do an intervention for the other 40%. 
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Figure 4.8 Distribution of reported adverse incidents in the various 
categories from January – June 2007. 
 
4.7. REPORTED ADVERSE INCIDENTS 
 
The adverse incidents will now be discussed individually according to their 
monthly appearance. 
 
4.7.1. January 2007 
In January 2007, two minor adverse incidents were reported. One incident 
occurred due to a dose calculation error and the other because of incorrect 
data transfer.  
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Adverse incident 1 (DCE) - Radiation prescription: 1.8Gy x 28 fractions (#). 
Total radiation dose: 54Gy. 
 
The dose calculation for the radiation treatment was done for 2Gy # while 
1.8Gy # was prescribed. The patient received 5 # radiation treatment on this 
dose before the error was detected. Thus, the patient would have received a 
total dose of 51.4Gy instead of 54Gy.  A correction was made for the 
adverse incident by compensating for the additional dose. 
 
Adverse incident 2 (DTE) - Radiation prescription: 3Gy x 7 #, 3Gy x 3 # on 
offcord fields, rest two weeks, 3Gy x 7 # on offcord fields and 3Gy x 3 # on 
booster fields. Total radiation dose = 60Gy. 
 
Due to a change in the patients’ separation measurement the dose monitor 
units were altered after the patient returned for second course radiation. It 
went unnoticed at the treatment unit and the patient received seven 
fractions radiation treatment on the offcord fields with this radiation dose. 
The patient received a total radiation dose of 60.4Gy instead of the 
prescribed 60Gy. The patient completed this specific segment of his 
radiation treatment and no correction could be made.  
 
4.7.2. February 2007  
One adverse incident was reported in February 2007.  
 
Adverse incident 1 (FP) – Radiation prescription: 2Gy x 25 #. Total radiation 
dose = 50Gy. 
 
A patient received a radiation treatment plan with electron fields. With the 
set-up of the patient during treatment, the collimation degrees were altered 
and did not correspond with the instructions received from the treatment 
planning unit on the patients’ treatment plan. The patient received two 
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fractions radiation treatment with the incorrect collimator angle. The electron 
field still covered the prescribed radiation treatment area but not according 
to the instructions of the treatment planning unit. It was not possible to 
correct this adverse incident. 
 
4.7.3. March 2007  
In March 2007, two minor adverse incidents were reported. An error in dose 
calculations was the cause of the one adverse incident and the use of the 
wrong radiation treatment energy resulted in the second adverse incident. 
 
Adverse incident 1 (DCE) – Radiation prescription: 2Gy x 25 #. Total 
radiation dose = 50Gy. 
 
A dose distribution was done for the isodose curve of 115% while the 
oncologist prescribed the radiation dose to the 110% isodose curve. The 
patient received one fraction radiation treatment with this radiation dose 
resulting in a 1.4Gy deviation from the prescribed total dose. No correction 
was made for this adverse incident because the deviation from the 
prescribed radiation treatment was miniscule. 
 
Adverse incident 2 (RE) – Radiation prescription: 100KV x 13 # and boost x 
2 #.  
 
The patient received orthovoltage radiation treatment. The patient received 
two fractions radiation treatment with 250KV radiation energy instead of the 
prescribed 100KV radiation energy. Due to the effect of the higher energy 
given the total number of radiation fraction treatments given were decreased 
in an effort to achieve the same result. 
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4.7.4. April 2007 
April 2007 had a higher occurrence of reported adverse incidents with a 
total of four reported adverse incidents. One adverse incident was due to 
treatment unit malfunction; one adverse incidents due to a dose calculation; 
one was a data transfer error and one incorrect patient. 
 
Adverse incident 1 (TUM) – 2Gy x 25 #. Total radiation dose = 50Gy. 
 
The treatment unit did not call up the last field in the patient’s radiation 
treatment sequence and the controller did not notice that not all the radiation 
fields had been given. The patient received one fraction radiation treatment 
like this. A distribution was done at the planning unit to calculate the 
deviation from the prescribed radiation dose. The patient received an 
equivalent of a 1.4Gy fraction dose instead of the prescribed 2Gy # dose. 
The adverse incident was rectified by compensating for the ‘lost’ 0.6Gy 
through 6 x 2.1Gy # and then returning to the normal radiation prescription.  
 
Adverse incident 2 (DCE) – Radiation prescription: 3Gy x 7 #, 3Gy x 3 # on 
offcord fields, rest two weeks, 3Gy x 7 # on offcord fields and 3Gy x 3 # on 
booster fields. Total radiation dose = 60Gy. 
 
The dose calculation was done incorrectly at the simulator and it was not 
checked at the radiation treatment unit before the patient received his first 
radiation treatment. The patient received one fraction radiation treatment 
with this dose resulting in an overdose of 0.22Gy. The adverse incident was 
corrected the following day by compensating for the incorrect radiation 
dose.    
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Adverse incident 3 (DTE) – Radiation prescription: 2Gy x 25 #. Total 
radiation dose = 50Gy. 
 
The monitor units were wrongly indicated on the radiation treatment plan 
and erroneously entered into the radiation treatment unit record-and-verify 
system and was not checked before the patient received radiation 
treatment. Patient received one fraction radiation treatment on this dose 
resulting in a 0.5Gy overdose. The adverse incident was corrected the 
following day by compensating for the imprecise radiation dose. 
 
Adverse incident 4 (IP) - Radiation prescription: 3Gy x 7 # opposing, 3Gy x 
3 # on conformal plan, rest two weeks, 3Gy x 7 # on conformal plan and 
3Gy x 3 # on booster plan. Total radiation dose = 60Gy. 
 
The wrong patient entered the radiation treatment room when another 
patient was called and the radiation therapist did not notice. The incorrect 
patient was receiving similar radiation treatment as the patient that was 
called so the tattoos on the patient correlated with the radiation plan given 
and contributed to the fact that the radiation therapists did not notice the 
error. Thus, the patient received one fraction radiation treatment on another 
patients’ radiation treatment plan. A distribution was done at the planning 
unit where the wrongly received treatment was incorporated with the 
patient’s prescribed radiation treatment plan. The fact that the patients were 
receiving similar treatment in the same anatomical region on the same 
radiation treatment unit limited this incident to a minor incident. No 
correction could be made for this adverse incident. 
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4.7.5. May 2007  
One minor adverse incident regarding error in dose was reported.  
 
Adverse incident 1 (DCE) – Radiation prescription: 2Gy x 25 #. Total 
radiation dose: 50Gy.  
 
The monitor units were incorrectly calculated and erroneously entered into 
the radiation treatment unit’s record-and-verify system and were not 
checked before the patient received radiation treatment. The patient 
received one fraction radiation treatment on this dose, which resulted in an 
under-dosage of 0.27Gy. The erroneous dose was compensated for in the 
next fraction radiation treatment. 
 
4.7.6. June 2007 
June 2007 had the highest occurrence of reported adverse incidents in the 
period under investigation, with a total of five adverse incidents reported. 
The adverse incidents were distributed evenly across the categories with 
one patient positioning error; one dose calculation error; one field 
positioning error and two shielding errors. 
 
Adverse incident 1 (DCE) – Radiation prescription: 3.4Gy x 11 #. Total 
radiation dose = 37.4Gy.  
 
The monitor units were incorrectly calculated and entered into the radiation 
treatment unit’s RV system and were not checked before the patient 
received his first radiation treatment. The patient received one fraction 
radiation treatment on this dose that resulted in an overdose of 0.12Gy. The 
adverse incident was corrected by compensating for this radiation dose. 
 
Adverse incident 2 (IS) - Radiation prescription: 2Gy x 20 #, 2Gy x 10 # on 
offcord fields and 2Gy x 5 # on booster fields. Total radiation dose = 70Gy. 
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The patient received treatment with extra shielding as if he was being 
treated with off-cord fields, while he was supposed to be treated with normal 
big fields with shielding of the cerebellum. The patient received one fraction 
radiation treatment like this. The adverse incident was corrected by 
deducting one fraction radiation dose from the original prescription of this 
specific segment of his radiation treatment course. 
 
Adverse incident 3 (FP) - Radiation prescription: 3Gy x 10 #. Total radiation 
dose = 30Gy.   
 
The isocentre coordinates were described incorrectly in the simulator 
instructions. The error was discovered with the electronic portal imaging. 
The patient received two fractions radiation treatment on this set-up. No 
correction could be made for this adverse incident. 
 
Adverse incident 4 (PP) – Radiation prescription: 1.8Gy x 23 # on conformal 
3D plan and 1.8Gy x 5 # on conformal 3D booster plan. Total radiation dose 
= 54Gy.  
 
A child was marked for radiation treatment of the brain and spinal cord. With 
the marking of the booster fields, it was discovered that his radiation 
treatment set-up position differed slightly from the original position. This was 
due to the fact that the child was scared, stressed and crying during the 
marking and immobilisation process. As his radiation treatment course 
progressed, he started to trust the process and relaxed. This caused an 
alteration of 5 mm in the position of his neck, which in turn caused an 
important part of the target volume to be shielded. Two additional radiation 
fields were given together with his booster fields to compensate for the lost 
radiation dose over the target volume.   
 
Adverse incident 5 (IS) - Radiation prescription: 1.8Gy x 22 #, 1.8Gy x 3 # 
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on smaller fields and 1.8Gy x 3 # on booster fields. Total radiation dose = 
54Gy. 
 
The shielding tray was made incorrectly. Too much of the target volume was 
shielded during the patient’s first fraction of radiation treatment. No 
correction could be made for this adverse incident.      
 
4.8. ORIGIN OF REPORTED ADVERSE INCIDENTS 
 
All the members in the sub-categories of the multi-disciplinary team of the 
radiation process are equally responsible for the correct execution of every 
step in this process. This includes the localisation process at the simulator, 
the planning process at the planning unit and the carrying out of the actual 
radiation treatment at the treatment unit.  As discussed in 4.4 the radiation 
therapists at the radiation treatment unit are the front-line operators 
responsible for the correct and accurate execution of the radiation treatment 
regimes and thus unfortunately they tend to be left with the mishaps of 
everyone who has played a role in the design of the radiation treatment 
procedure (NRC 1995: x). In essence, these radiation therapists have the 
greatest responsibility to stop any potential incidents from turning into actual 
incidents. If an incident originated at the simulator or the planning unit and 
the personnel at the radiation treatment unit did not detect it, a potential 
incident turns into an actual incident. Figure 4.9 illustrates the origins of the 
reported adverse incidents. 
 
In January one incident had its origin at the planning unit where the 
incorrect dose fraction size was calculated. The second incident originated 
at the radiation treatment unit. February saw one incident due to the actions 
of the radiation treatment unit. March had two incidents with one originating 
at the planning unit and one at the radiation treatment unit. In April four 
adverse incidents were reported with its origins distributed between the 
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units – one at the planning unit, one at the simulator and two at the radiation 
treatment unit. In May there was one incident reported which originated at 
the simulator. June had the highest number of adverse incidents reported 
with three originating at the simulator and two at the treatment units.  
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Figure 4.9 Origin of reported adverse incidents in the various 
categories from January – June 2007. 
 
4.9. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM MEETINGS 
 
During these meetings (3.2.3) the reported adverse incidents, their 
distribution in the different categories, possible reasons for the occurrence 
of the adverse incidents and any corrective actions and preventative steps 
that were to be taken, were discussed. One of the items on the agenda of 
these meetings was the opportunity for the radiation therapists to air their 
views and comment on possible reasons for the reported adverse incidents 
as well as solutions and preventative steps to be taken to minimise or avert 
future incidents. 
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4.9.1. Factors contributing to the occurrence of adverse incidents: 
opinions of the radiation therapists. 
There are numerous factors that can play a role in the occurrence of the 
reported adverse incidents, as deducted from the opinions of the radiation 
therapists during the meetings. The following views, regarding factors 
influencing the occurrence of reported adverse incidents, were expressed 
by the radiation therapists during the meetings (See Appendix 5). 
 
April had the lowest recorded number of patients and radiation treatments 
but also the lowest number of working days due to the numerous public 
holidays that included Easter weekend and Freedom Day. This puts extra 
stress on the personnel because some patients have to receive two 
radiation treatments on one day to finish in time to return to their homes. 
The patients also get agitated and impatient and want to be treated as soon 
as possible which pressures the radiation therapists into increasing their 
work pace. The SL14 treatment unit were out of commission for one week 
during April and the patients receiving treatment on that unit had to be 
distributed amongst the remaining radiation treatment units. The distribution 
of the patients between the radiation treatment units necessitated the 
calculation of new applicable doses and the patients’ radiation treatment 
information had to be entered into the newly allocated radiation treatment 
unit’s computerised record-and-verify system (See Appendix 5 – Meeting 
2/2007 - 2.2.2.). Thus, the second highest adverse incident rate was 
recorded in April. 
 
June had the highest reported incident rate but the second highest recorded 
workload. In June the SL25 radiation treatment unit were out of order for 
one week and the patients receiving treatment at that unit had to be 
distributed between the other radiation treatment units in the same manner 
as described above. There was also one week in June when all the students 
were absent due to examinations. This together with numerous personnel 
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falling ill led to a shortage of personnel who had to cope with a very high 
workload (See Appendix 5 – Meeting 3/2007 - 3.2.2.). 
 
Other factors that were discussed included the shortage of personnel, the 
rotation of personnel and the fact that the department is a training facility. 
They noted that radiation therapist rotation on the radiation treatment units 
could affect the occurrence of adverse incidents due to the fact that the 
newly rotated personnel were not familiar with the patients or their radiation 
treatment set-up (See Appendix 5 – Meeting 2/2007 - 2.2.2.). Universitas 
Annexe is an academic hospital and fulfils the role of a learning institute. 
New students, who are still in the early stages of their training, did not 
possess the required knowledge to perform duties accurately and needed 
constant monitoring, assistance and attention. This situation may influence 
the occurrence of adverse incidents negatively (See Appendix 5 – Meeting 
1/2007 - 1.1.2.).  
 
If the findings of the present study are then compared to findings in the 
literature, there are several similarities that can be pointed out. In a study 
performed by Huang et al., (2005: 1592) a multidisciplinary site-specific 
working group met weekly throughout August 2001, to discuss the 
occurrence of adverse radiation therapy incidents. In concordance with the 
study performed at Universitas Annexe concerns were identified about the 
role of patients being moved between radiation treatment units due to 
machine service. Additionally, radiation therapists that were frequently 
relocated between radiation treatment units also raised concern.  
 
According to Valentin’s (2000: 43) findings a lack of appropriate personnel 
resources and insufficiently qualified or untrained personnel, together with 
an increase in the workload, contributed to the occurrence of adverse 
radiation incidents. This can be brought in line with the comments made by 
the radiation therapists that the new students do not possess the required 
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knowledge to perform duties accurately and effectively. Valentin (200: 43) 
also commented that need for effective systematic quality control 
procedures, the reassessment of personnel expertise and resources, as 
well as adequate training on newly purchased radiation treatment units also 
affected the occurrence of adverse radiation incidents.  
 
Dunn (2003: 62) also states that special consideration should be given to 
personnel workload, which may become excessive in the case of installation 
of new equipment, set-up of a new technology or an increase in patient 
load. This will lead to an increased risk of adverse incidents because of the 
difficulty of fully applying the quality control procedures in these situations. 
 
All of the contributing factors mentioned above also correspond with the 
findings of the Royal College of Radiologists (RCR) (2008: 9) regarding 
factors contributing to the occurrence of adverse incidents. The RCR lists 
lack of training, competence or experience as a contributing factor. This 
corresponds with views of the radiation therapists at Universitas regarding 
the students. The RCR (2008: 9) states that fatigue and stress also 
contributes to the incidence of incidents. As well as the poor design and 
documentation of procedures, poor communication and staffing and skills 
levels.  
  
4.10. PREVENTATIVE STEPS 
 
The meetings that were held with the radiation therapists gave the 
opportunity to discuss potential preventative steps that could be taken to 
minimize the occurrence of adverse incidents. These steps were additional 
to the quality procedures already implemented at the department. Some of 
the suggestions made during the meetings were steps that were already in 
place in the existing quality control system. However, attention to these 
quality steps was overlooked in the daily routines. Upon reflection on the 
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adverse incidents, the following opinions were conveyed during these 
meetings, in order to address the quality of a patient radiation therapy 
schedule.  
 
4.10.1. The Simulator 
 The radiation therapists working at the simulator should double-check 
each other on the simulator set-up instructions and the calculated 
monitor units before the radiation treatment files are passed on to the 
radiation treatment units (See Appendix 5 – Meeting 2/2007 - 2.2.3.). 
 The complete process of starting a patient for radiation therapy at the 
radiation treatment unit can take up to an hour. Thus, the personnel 
at the radiation treatment units have to be informed before any 
unscheduled patients are marked for radiation treatment at the 
simulator, so that they can be prepared for the patients and arrange 
their already demanding work schedule accordingly (See Appendix 5 
– Meeting 1/2007 - 1.1.2.). 
 
4.10.2. Radiation Treatment Units 
 Bearing in mind that extended working hours e.g. shifts, are 
improbable due to the shortage of personnel, a time limit should be 
determined in the afternoon at the radiation treatment units, where 
after patients are not allowed to start with radiation treatment. This 
would apply, unless it is for emergency radiation treatment, such as 
bleeding patients, patients with paralysis or those having difficulty 
with breathing. The time limit should be implemented, to decrease 
the pressure on the personnel and to minimise the probability of 
adverse incidents occurring (See Appendix – Meeting 1/2007 – 
1.1.2.). 
 No patients are to start with their radiation treatment before all the 
necessary verification checks have been performed. These 
verification checks include the dose calculation checks and the 
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secondary checks on the information that was entered into the 
computerised record-and-verify system at the radiation treatment unit 
(See Appendix 5 – Meeting 1/2007 – 1.1.3.). 
 Patient identification is of utmost importance. Before a patient enters 
the radiation treatment room the patient name, birth date and photo 
should be controlled (See Appendix 5 – Meeting 2/2007 – 2.2.3.). 
 Any shielding accessories e.g. shielding, MCPs and multi-leaf 
collimation has to be verified before the radiation therapy of the 
patient commences (See Appendix 5 – Meeting 3/2007 - 3.2.3.). 
 The radiation therapists who do the initial radiation set-up on the first 
day of treatment, have to carry out the first radiation treatment 
completely to check for any irregularities during the radiation 
treatment session and between the individual radiation treatment 
fields (See Appendix 5 – Meeting 3/2007 - 3.2.3.). 
 If there are any queries or doubts about a prescription or radiation 
treatment set-up, at the start of, or during the radiation treatment of a 
patient, the relevant personnel, be it the oncologist, the planning 
radiation therapist or the simulator radiation therapist, have to be 
contacted and consulted on the matter. This needs to be done to 
clarify any uncertainties regarding the radiation treatment of the 
patient (See Appendix 5 – Meeting 1/2007 - 1.2.3.). 
 
Holmberg & McClean (2002: 14) suggest that different personnel groups 
should perform primary and secondary checks separately, on the initial 
radiation treatment calculations. Colleagues of equal stature should review 
prescriptions and simulations of the radiation treatment plans should be 
performed to verify the geometric settings. At the department, the radiation 
therapists perform the primary and secondary verifications before the 
radiation therapy commences and the medical physicist does the third 
verification before the patient receives his third fraction radiation therapy, for 
opposing fields. The medical physicist controls three-dimensional conformal 
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plans before a radiation treatment is given on that plan. Weekly overview 
inspections of major parameters in treatment charts and in the record-and-
verify system are and should be performed according to Holmberg & 
McClean (2002: 14). 
 
The ICRP (2001: 51) also reported the occurrence of adverse incidents due 
to the delivery of radiation treatment to the wrong patient. It is stated that 
provisions and procedures should be in place to eliminate incidents like this 
from occurring. These procedures include the identification of the patient 
through a patient photograph, patient name, patient identification number 
and/or address. Huang et al., (2005: 1591) reports that personnel rotation 
on the radiation treatment units plays a role in the occurrence of adverse 
incidents and recommends that personnel allocations be extended on 
specific treatment units. At Universitas Annex, the shortage of personnel 
limits the personnel rotation but personnel from one treatment unit are 
relocated to another unit when for a short period of time when there is a 
shortage due to illness or annual leave. It is advised that these personnel 
work under strict supervision.  
 
According to Patton et al., (2003: 52) four elements must be present for an 
external radiation beam treatment to be administered correctly: the correct 
patient; the correct data; the correct radiation treatment site and correct 
radiation beam modifications. Deficiencies in these elements lead to 
mistakes. Patton et al., (2003: 55) states, that continuous personnel 
alertness and critical verification of correct treatment parameters before 
administering radiation treatments, are a necessity. The risk of adverse 
radiation incidents due to incorrect radiation treatment parameters can be 
significantly reduced with the use of electronic, rather than manual transfer 
of treatment parameters between the treatment planning unit and / or 
simulator and the record-and-verify systems of the radiation treatment units. 
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Electronic data transfer is currently only available on two of the four 
radiation treatment units at the department. 
 
Patton et al., (2003: 55) advise that the departmental procedures for 
radiation therapy following simulation and radiation treatment planning, 
should include a double check of the radiation treatment parameters 
received from the simulator and / or treatment planning unit. These 
controlled parameters should then be entered into the record-and-verify 
system of the radiation treatment unit. These controls should be performed 
by a dosimetrist. The department does not employ a dosimetrist, thus the 
controls are all performed by the radiation therapists themselves, with 
additional verification by the medical physicist. Weekly radiation chart 
reviews, as well as a final chart check at the end of the patient’s radiation 
treatment course, should also be included in the departmental procedures. 
Verification of the patient identification should be done by using a 
photograph and by name. In the department, photographs are attached to 
the patients’ radiation treatment files. The electronic portal images are 
verified by the radiation therapist before the first radiation treatment, and 
then reviewed by the oncologist after radiation treatment. 
 
4.11. COMPARISON WITH RELATED STUDIES 
 
The study demonstrated the trends and frequency of adverse radiation 
incidents during radiation therapy at the Oncotherapy Department, 
Universitas Annexe, Bloemfontein, from January 2007 to June 2007.  
 
When comparing the results with similar data reported in related studies 
(See 2.11), the above-mentioned department falls well within the reported 
error rate, with a total of 15 minor adverse incidents reported over a 6-
month period. Calandrino et al., (1997: 272) reported a total of 217 errors 
over a period of 61 months from September 1991 to November 1996 with 
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an average of 3.6 errors detected per month. Swann-D’Emilia et al., (1990: 
187) reported a total of 87 misadministrations over a period of 24 months 
with an average of 3.6 errors per month. Williams et al., (1991: 200) 
recorded a total of 28 genuine errors over a period of 9 months which gives 
an error rate of 3.1 errors per month. Huang et al., (2005: 1593) reported an 
average error rate of 7.7 errors per month with a total of 555 treatments 
delivered with errors from January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2002. 
Patton et al., (2003: 52) reported 38 technical error reporting forms with an 
average of 3.2 per month which were submitted between July 1, 1999 and 
June 30, 2000. According to Yeung et al., (2005: 283) a total of 634 
incidents were reported between November 1992 and December 2002 with 
an average of 5.1 per month (2.11) (See Figure 5.2).  
 
If we look at the work distribution within these departments, the study with 
the highest error rate of 7.7 errors per month, Huang et al., (2005: 1593), 
had the most radiation treatment units. This study was performed at the 
Princess Margaret Hospital which is the largest radiation therapy center in 
Canada and over the study period operations were performed on 17 
radiation therapy units. The study period was also the second longest with 
72 months.  
 
The second highest error rate of 5.1 errors per month was reported by 
Yeung et al., (2005: 283), which also had the longest study period with 121 
months and the highest number of patients treated per treatment unit per 
month. An average of 30 patients was treated per month per radiation 
treatment unit. The department with the lowest error rate reported was the 
Beatson Oncology Centre (Williams et al., 1991: 200), which recorded an 
average of 3.1 errors per month. This study information was obtained over 
the shortest study period of nine months. This department also had the 
lowest amount of three radiation treatment units and reported the lowest 
amount of radiation treatments, 79 per month performed per treatment unit. 
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Thus, in correlation with these studies, the results obtained at the 
Oncotherapy Department, Universitas Annexe, Bloemfontein compared 
favourably. During the six-month study period an average of 2.5 adverse 
incidents per month were reported. Taking into consideration that an 
average of 45 patients were treated with an average of 478 radiation 
treatments per radiation treatment unit per month it concludes in an error 
rate of 0.52% of the radiation treatments. 
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Figure 4.10 Reported incident distributions of various studies  
 
4.12. CONCLUSION 
 
The reported and documented adverse incidents were discussed and 
presented with the aid of frequency distribution tables and graphs. The 
radiation patients, radiation treatments, radiation fields and personnel 
figures, during the period of the study was also presented.  
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A detailed depiction of the reported adverse incidents is given in table 4.1 
(See Appendix 4). The reported adverse incidents are depicted according to 
the month of occurrence, category of the reported adverse incident and the 
magnitude of the reported adverse incident. 
 
Chapter 5 will include an assessment of the results where it will be 
discussed in greater detail. Chapter 5 will furthermore contain the quality 
control procedure manual as deduced from the results. 
 
In a combined effort from the personnel at the department, the adverse 
incident monitoring, adverse incident discussions and literature reviews, the 
quality control procedure manual for Radiation Therapists at Universitas 
Annexe have been compiled to assist and guide in the delivery of 
radiotherapy of the highest standard at the above mentioned department. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
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DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 4 the results of the study were presented, answering the first two 
objectives of the study namely to determine the origin, frequency and 
classification of adverse incidents leading to inaccurate delivery of radiation 
therapy to patients and to compare these results with similar published 
results. The impact of these findings on the quality assurance and control 
procedures concerning radiation therapy at the department will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
 
This chapter will provide a summation and discussion of the study which will 
include an overview; the distribution of the adverse incidents; the factors 
influencing the occurrence of the adverse incidents; opinions of the radiation 
therapists; preventative steps; a comparison with related studies; an in 
depth look at the quality control procedure manual which was designed, 
based on the results of the study and the literature information gathered on 
the subject; the limitations of the study; recommendations and the final 
conclusion. 
 
5.2. OVERVIEW 
 
From January 2007 to June 2007 a clinical quality audit was performed at 
the department to identify deviations of quality activities from the planned 
arrangements and to initiate corrective actions in the event of deviations 
observed. The objective of the audit was to set up a QC procedure manual 
designed to minimise the occurrence and consequences of any events that 
could lead to an adverse incident in the radiation therapy schedule of a 
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patient and thus potentially have an impact on the quality and safety of 
patient treatment (Leer et al., 1998: 74). 
 
The data collection was executed by determining the origin and frequency of 
adverse incidents leading to inaccurate delivery of radiation therapy to 
patients and classifying them as major or minor adverse incidents by 
employing an adverse incident reporting system. The frequency and origin 
of the reported adverse incidents were studied, discussed and combined 
with all of the information from literature to produce a quality control 
procedure manual that will focus on tasks of the radiation therapists at the 
department and facilitate in the monitoring, evaluation and improvement of 
the superiority of radiation therapy which would result in a more effective 
and advanced quality radiation oncology care. 
 
5.3. RESULTS 
 
A total of 1 093 patients were treated with 37 036 radiation treatment fields 
in 11 466 radiation treatments during the period of the study at the 
department. The simulator handled 1 918 patients and the radiation 
planning unit did a combination of 547 contours, distributions and three-
dimensional plans. An average of 23 radiation therapists was performing 
duties during the period of the study. During this time a total of 15 minor 
adverse incidents were reported. 
 
During this study it was revealed that adverse incidents occurred in all of the 
various phases of the complex process of radiation therapy at the 
department. The phases include the simulation; radiation treatment 
planning; shielding accessories; dose calculation and the radiation 
treatment execution. Human errors as well as treatment unit errors 
contributed to the sum of all the adverse incidents that were reported during 
the period of the study.  
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As discussed in Chapter Four (4.6) the monthly distribution of the reported 
adverse incidents during the period of the study were as follows (Figure 
4.7): January 2 minor adverse incidents were reported; February 1 minor 
adverse incident reported; 2 minor adverse incidents were reported in 
March; April presented 4 reported minor adverse incidents; in May 1 minor 
adverse incident were reported and June had the highest reported amount 
with 5 minor adverse incidents.  
 
Of the total of 15 reported adverse incidents eight originated at the pre-
treatment units and seven at the radiation treatment units. As discussed in 
4.8 the final responsibility to detect and prevent adverse incidents from 
occurring falls on the personnel at the radiation treatment units.  
 
In January, March and April the planning unit was the point of origin of one 
of the monthly reported adverse incidents. The planning unit had only two 
radiation planning therapist in January, three in March, April and June and 
four in February and May (see Fig. 4.6). The months with the fewest number 
of planning personnel correlates with the months that the incidents 
originated in the planning unit. January also saw the highest workload in the 
planning unit. 
 
In April and May the simulator was responsible for one reported adverse 
incident per month and for three adverse incidents in the month of June.  
The personnel distribution at the simulator was as follows:  in January five 
radiation therapists; February and March seven radiation therapists; April 
and June six and in May five radiation therapists were allocated at the 
simulator. The productivity ranking of the months is January, May, February, 
June, March and April in descending order. Thus, no direct correlation can 
be made between personnel present, the workload and the occurrence of 
incidents at the simulator. 
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At the radiation treatment units February was the busiest with June, March, 
May, January and April following. The origin of incidents at the radiation 
treatment units were distributed as follows: in January, February and March 
there were one incident each month that originated at the radiation 
treatment units and in April and June two incidents each month. The 
personnel in attendance were, in descending order: 27 in February, 25 in 
March, 23 in January and April, 21 in May and 19 in June. The month of 
June had the least amount of personnel in attendance and the highest 
occurrence of reported adverse incidents. Figure 5.1 offers a depiction of 
the relation between workload, personnel in attendance and occurrence of 
reported adverse incidents. According to the Figure 5.1, there is no direct 
correlation between the workload, personnel and the adverse incidents.  
 
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
PATIENTS SIMULATOR PLANNING FIELDS
TREATMENTS INCIDENTS PERSONNEL
 
 
Figure 5.1 Relation between workload, personnel in attendance and 
occurrence of reported adverse incidents 
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5.4. THE QUALITY CONTROL PROCEDURE MANUAL 
 
The information acquired from the monitoring of the adverse incidents and 
from the meetings held at the department, was used in conjunction with the 
information gathered from the literature consulted (See 1.9.6.), on radiation 
quality assurance and radiation quality control, to compile this quality control 
procedure manual in accordance with the specific quality control 
requirements of the department. Guidelines given by the AAPM Radiation 
Therapy Committee Task Group 40 in their report on Comprehensive 
Quality Assurance for Radiation Oncology (Kutcher et al., 1994: 583-615), 
and recommendations by Thwaites et al., (1995: 63) were especially useful 
in the compilation of the quality control procedure manual. 
 
Once implemented, the quality control procedure manual will potentially 
provide a controlled and systematic evaluation mechanism for the quality 
control procedures, action criteria and responsibility and commitment to 
perform these procedures during the radiation therapy process at the 
department. 
 
The quality control procedure manual may appear to be repetitive in the way 
that many actions are performed repeatedly, but repetition is part of the 
daily and weekly quality control process of radiation therapy at the 
department and there are continuous verification and controlling being 
performed in each area. 
 
Every little detail regarding the patient’s radiation treatment has to be 
checked, double-checked and checked again.  Khan & Potish (1998: 37) 
state that radiation therapy cannot be metabolized, erased or revoked – 
once the dose of radiation is delivered, it cannot be removed. Thus, it is of 
the utmost importance that the radiation treatment should be administered 
accurately, meticulously and judiciously. There is little chance to rectify a 
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poorly planned or administered course of radiation treatment. One 
inaccurate radiation treatment can lead to paralysis, blindness, deafness or 
even death. Therefore, it is crucial that every little detail is repeatedly 
verified at all the different sections of the radiation therapy process.      
 
A narration of the quality control procedure manual will now be presented 
according to the different sections in the manual. The sections follow the 
path of the cancer patient who enters the department to receive radiation 
therapy. Every section provides the quality control checks that should be 
performed with tick boxes present where the appropriate response can be 
ticked off (See Appendix 6).  
 
5.4.1. SECTION A – THE SIMULATOR 
 
5.4.1.1. Patient identification 
When a patient arrives at the simulator, it is important to determine if it is the 
correct patient who is going to be simulated. Thus, the correct patient has to 
be identified. This must be done by asking the patient what his / her name 
is. If it is the correct name, the identification number and address of the 
patient has to be confirmed as well (Thwaites et al., 1995: 68).  
 
After the correct patient has been identified, the radiation therapist has to 
verify whether the patient signed a witnessed consent form, together with 
the oncologist, for all the procedures regarding the radiation therapy that are 
going to be performed. 
 
5.4.1.2. Initial physical evaluation of patient and pertinent clinical 
information  
Before any procedures can be performed on the patient, an initial evaluation 
of the patient file has to be performed for the assessment of the patient’s 
diagnosis. The radiation therapist in charge of the simulation of the patient 
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has to determine whether the correct procedure is going to be performed. 
This evaluation includes the determination of the diagnosis of the disease 
and the stage of the disease as this influences the anatomical site of the 
patient to be simulated and whether the patient will be simulated for radical 
or palliative radiation treatment. It is important that there should be a history 
of the patient’s disease, a pertinent pathology report and a positive histology 
report to corroborate the diagnosis and stage of the patient’s disease 
(Thwaites et al., 1995: 69) (Kutcher et al., 1994: 608). 
  
It is also important to be aware of the HIV status of the patient, as this can 
affect the radiation treatment option, as well as the side effects experienced 
by the patient during radiation treatment and the prognosis of the patient. 
The HIV status of the patient can affect the patients’ tolerance of the 
radiation treatment regime, thus determining whether a patient with a radical 
staging might receive a palliative radiation treatment regime. The knowledge 
of the HIV status is important for the safety of the personnel as well. The 
assessment of the patient’s physical condition is necessary, as radiation 
therapy can be very traumatic, stressful and invasive on the body. If a 
patient is to receive radical radiation treatment but his / her physical 
condition does not allow it, it could affect the radiation treatment option.  
 
5.4.1.3. Previously treated or concurrently treated volumes in which 
dose can overlap with the current treatment volume 
The patient’s radiation treatment file has to be checked to determine if the 
patient has received previous radiation therapy. If s/he has received 
previous radiation treatment, the simulator films of the previously treated 
area have to be located and reviewed to establish any potential overlap with 
the current radiation treatment site.  If present, the isodose distributions 
have to be reviewed as well, to establish potential overlap with current 
radiation treatment fields. If the current radiation fields are adjacent to the 
previous radiation fields, the departmental protocol states that there should 
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be a 0.5 cm separation between the adjacent radiation fields. A cumulative 
radiation dose calculation has to be done if the oncologist requests it, as 
well as in vivo measurements, where appropriate Thwaites et al., (1995: 
68). 
 
5.4.1.4. Simulator Room Initial Set-up 
When the radiation treatment of a patient is to be simulated at the simulator, 
the simulator room has to be prepared according to the localisation that is 
going to be performed. The simulator unit has to be placed in the standard 
set-up position that includes that the gantry should be on 0°, the collimator 
90° and the couch rotation on 0°. The magnification factor used is 1.5 and 
this should be checked as well. The appropriate patient immobilisation 
devices are then chosen according to the anatomical area that is going to 
be simulated and the position in which the patient is set-up for the specified 
radiation treatment fields requested by the oncologist.   
 
5.4.1.5. Simulation Set-up Notes 
After the simulation of the patient is completed, it is very important to 
transfer all the information about the patient set-up, the field parameters and 
the radiation treatment regime, to the patient radiation treatment file, which 
will be handed to the radiation treatment unit where the patient receives 
radiation therapy. The following requirements for the patient treatment set-
up should be noted and motivated where required: the precise patient 
positioning, the patient immobilisation devices used to ensure the patient 
treatment position and the general set-up instructions.  
 
Together with the patient treatment set-up, the following physical treatment 
parameters have to be documented: the location of the radiation field; the 
anatomical location of the tattoos with references to anatomical landmarks, 
where possible; the radiation field size; whether there was any collimation 
rotation away from the standard 90°; whether the simulation was done 
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isocentric (SAD) or on a source surface distance (SSD) of a 100cm; and the 
separation of the anatomical area being treated.  
 
If there is any shielding, MLCs or bolus required during the radiation 
treatment, it has to be noted together with their location and the thickness of 
the bolus. If the patient needs a bite-block or tongue depressor, it should be 
documented as well. The names of the radiation therapists responsible for 
the simulation of the patient have to be recorded as well. All of the 
documented information should be double-checked by the other radiation 
therapist present during the simulation of the patient (Kutcher et al., 1994: 
608).    
 
5.4.1.6. Radiation Treatment Prescription 
With the completion of the simulation of the patient, the radiation treatment 
prescription is completed, on the radiation prescription page in the patient’s 
radiation treatment file, by the oncologist in charge of the patient. The 
completed radiation prescription has to be controlled by the simulator 
radiation therapist, before the radiation treatment file is handed over to the 
radiation treatment unit. The radiation treatment prescription should include 
the radiation treatment site; the radiation treatment mode and energy; a 
description of the radiation treatment field; the given radiation dose, which is 
the fractionation size and the percentage central dose. The field size has to 
be recorded and whether it is on a source surface distance of 100cm, or if it 
is isocentric. The daily radiation dose, total radiation dose and the 
fractionation scheme, have to be described. The radiation treatment 
prescription has to be signed and dated by the oncologist, as well as any 
radiation prescription changes that have been made. The radiation therapist 
has to verify that the radiation prescription coincides with the departmental 
guidelines and protocols. The radiation treatment protocol files at the 
simulator can be utilised for this verification (Thwaites et al., 1995: 68) 
(Kutcher et al., 1994: 595).  
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5.4.1.7. Radiation Monitor Units (MU) Calculation 
For opposing radiation fields, the monitor units (MU) have to be calculated 
and checked before the radiation treatment file is handed over to the 
radiation treatment unit. The daily dose fractionation used has to be correct. 
The correct field size; modality; radiation treatment unit; radiation treatment 
energy and patient separation, have to be used in the calculation of the MU. 
The correct equivalent square has to be calculated and used. The correct 
source surface distance or isocentric, should be applied in the calculation of 
the MU. If beam blocking is extensive, the appropriate equivalent square 
calculations have to be made. If use of bolus is extensive, the appropriate 
separation has to be used (Kutcher et al., 1994: 598). 
 
5.4.2. SECTION B – PLANNING UNIT 
  
5.4.2.1. The Scanner Form 
When the CT images of the patient are received and transferred to the 
radiation treatment planning unit, there are several factors that should be 
controlled before, during and after the radiation treatment planning process. 
 
The patient information has to be controlled. This includes the patient name, 
birth date and radiation therapy number (RT number). The patient 
orientation has to be controlled – whether the patient was positioned in an 
antero-posterior or postero-anterior position and whether the patient was 
scanned with his / her head entering the CT first or his / her feet entering 
first (Khan, 2007: 40). 
. 
The information received from the simulator has to be controlled for the 
patient set-up. This includes the precise patient positioning, the patient 
immobilisation devices used to ensure the patient treatment position and the 
general set-up instructions. If the patient needs a bite-block or tongue 
depressor, it should be documented as well. This information should be 
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entered into the radiation treatment planning unit computer. The radiation 
treatment unit should be noted as well as whether the prescription falls 
within department protocol. It should be checked if a PTV was drawn in and 
signed by the consultant oncologist.    
 
5.4.2.2. Treatment Planning Preparation 
Before any planning can commence the patient identification and radiation 
therapy method has to be controlled. The planning directory where the 
patient is saved, the patient name and RT number has to be controlled. 
When it has been established that it is the correct patient, reference 
markers are placed on the tattoos.  
 
5.4.2.3. Treatment Planning Process 
When it has been established that it is the correct patient and the correct 
PTV the planning process can begin. The radiation beams are positioned 
and/or adjusted to deliver the required dose to the planning target volume 
while sparing the normal surrounding tissue and critical structures. The 
fields have to be described correctly according to their placement e.g. left 
lateral pelvis, the correct radiation treatment unit have to be selected as well 
as the treatment method – SAD / SSD. The field are then placed on the 
correct isocentric point. This placement can differ from patient to patient, 
depending on which treatment method is being used. The field sizes, gantry 
angle, collimator angles and wedges are then adjusted according to the 
shape of the PTV. When all the beams have been placed the dose are 
normalised to a point e.g. the isocentre point or a specific beam weight 
point. The correct isodose curves are selected to display the dose 
distribution. To obtain the required dose distribution, the necessary 
alterations are made according to the displayed dose distributions (Khan, 
2007: 125 - 130). 
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5.4.2.4. Treatment Plan Evaluation  
The isodose curves have to be meticulously controlled. At the department, 
the dose is usually normalised to the isocentre, but the prescription is done 
to the 95% isodose line, so that the whole PTV receives 100% of the 
prescribed dose. The minimum and maximum dose must be controlled. The 
hot spot - where the clinical target volume receives the highest dose - must 
not exceed 107% of the total dose. The minimum dose in the target volume 
must not be less than 5% of the prescribed dose. The dose received by the 
critical structures in the area of radiation must be controlled to verify that it is 
within the tolerance dose of the specific structure. The three dimensional 
conformal radiation treatment plans (3DCRTP) have to be viewed and 
authorised by the oncologist, before it is handed to the radiation treatment 
units (Kutcher et al., 1994: 598) (Khan, 2007: 130). 
.  
5.4.2.5. Dose Calculation 
The dose delivered to the PTV is calculated according to the prescription 
and the isodose line selected by the oncologist to determine the treatment 
unit monitor units. The correct fractions are read in, then the isodose curve 
indicated by the oncologist is selected for prescription and the total dose are 
entered into the radiation treatment planning unit (Khan, 2007: 129). 
 
5.4.2.6. Graphical Print-out Preparation 
The printout has to include a graphical printout of the 3DCRTP, with the 
patient parameters and simulator set-up notes. If there is any shielding, 
MLCs or bolus required during the radiation treatment, it has to be noted, 
together with its location and the thickness of the bolus. All the physical 
beam parameters and a computerised MU calculation work sheet, have to 
be present as well. The prescribed isodose percentage has to be indicated, 
as chosen by the oncologist. The radiation therapist responsible for the 
design of the radiation therapy plan has to sign the printout of the radiation 
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treatment plan, which is given to simulator and radiation treatment units 
(Kutcher et al., 1994: 590). 
 
5.4.3. SECTION C – RADIATION TREATMENT UNITS 
 
When the personnel at the radiation treatment unit receive the radiation 
treatment file from the simulator it should be thoroughly evaluated before 
the data is entered into the record-and-verify system of the radiation unit 
and the radiation treatment of the patient commences.  
 
5.4.3.1. Simulator Set-up Page 
The simulator / set-up page should be reviewed for each field, to determine 
whether the necessary information is accurately and clearly indicated. In the 
simulation set-up notes the patient parameters should be discussed in 
detail. All of this information is applied in the execution of the radiation 
therapy of the patient and it is vital that all necessary information is present 
and correct. 
 
The information reviewed includes the precise patient positioning; the 
patient’s immobilisation devices used to ensure this specific patient 
treatment position and the general set-up instructions. All the physical 
parameters have to be documented as well. The physical parameters 
include the location of the radiation field; the anatomical location of the 
tattoos with references to anatomical landmarks – where possible; the 
radiation field size; whether there was any collimation rotation away from 
the standard 90°; whether the simulation was done isocentric or on a source 
surface distance of a 100cm and the separation of the anatomical area 
being treated (NRC, 1995: 9).  
.  
If there is any shielding, MLCs or bolus to be used during the radiation 
treatment, it has to be noted, together with its location and the thickness of 
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the bolus. If a bite-block or tongue depressor / immobiliser were used in the 
simulation of the patient, it should be documented as well. The names of the 
radiation therapists responsible for the simulation of the patient have to be 
recorded as well (NRC 1995: 9) (Kutcher et al., 1994: 608). 
 
5.4.3.2. Radiation Treatment Prescription 
The radiation treatment prescription, as received from the simulator, has to 
be controlled by the radiation therapist at the radiation treatment unit before 
the information is entered into the record-and-verify system. The radiation 
treatment prescription should include the radiation treatment site; the 
radiation treatment mode and energy; a description of the radiation 
treatment field; the given radiation dose, which is the fractionation size and 
the percentage central dose.  
 
The field size has to be documented and whether it is on a source surface 
distance of 100cm, or if it is isocentric. The daily radiation dose, total 
radiation dose and the fractionation scheme has to be described. The 
radiation treatment prescription has to be signed and dated by the 
oncologist, as well as any radiation prescription changes that have been 
made. The radiation prescription coincides with the departmental guidelines 
(Kutcher et al., 1994: 595) (Thwaites et al., 1995: 69).  
 
5.4.3.3. Radiation Monitor Units (MU) Calculation 
Before the calculated monitor units are entered into the record-and-verify 
system of the radiation unit, it has to be reviewed. The daily dose 
fractionation used, has to be verified. The field size; modality; radiation 
treatment unit; radiation treatment energy and patient separation that were 
used to calculate MU, have to be controlled. The correct equivalent square 
has to be controlled.  
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The correct source surface distance or isocentric method, which was 
applied in the calculation of the MU, has to be controlled. If beam blocking is 
extensive, the appropriate equivalent square calculations have to be 
checked. If the use of bolus is extensive, the appropriate separation has to 
be controlled. The hot spots in treatment plans have to be checked to see if 
it is within acceptable limits. The MU indicated on the daily record for a 
particular field has to be checked for comparison to the correct MU 
calculation. If an electron beam radiation treatment or a single beam 
radiation treatment is given, the correct output factor has to be controlled. 
 
All of the information above, regarding the patient set-up, the field 
parameters, the radiation monitor units and the radiation prescription, 
should then be meticulously entered into the record-and-verify system of the 
radiation treatment unit and controlled by a second radiation therapist 
working at that specific radiation treatment unit. No treatment should be 
given before all of the above checks have been performed twice (Kutcher et 
al., 1994: 598,607) (Thwaites et al., 1995: 69). 
 
5.4.3.4. Initial physical evaluation of patient and pertinent clinical 
information  
In accordance with the simulator, an initial evaluation of the patient file has 
to be performed for the verification of the patient’s diagnosis and staging 
before any radiation therapy procedures can be performed on the patient. 
This must be done to determine whether the correct simulation procedure 
was performed on the patient and whether the correct radiation therapy 
procedure is going to be performed. The evaluation includes the 
determination of the diagnosis of the disease and the stage of the disease. 
It is important that there should be a history of the patient’s disease, a 
pertinent pathology report and a positive histology report to corroborate the 
diagnosis and stage of the patient’s disease (Kutcher et al., 1994: 609).  
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The assessment of the patient’s physical condition is necessary, as 
radiation therapy can be very traumatic, invasive and stressful on the body. 
If a patient were to receive radical radiation treatment but his / her physical 
condition does not allow it, it could affect the radiation treatment option. The 
radiation therapists performing duties at the radiation treatment units, have 
to continuously evaluate the physical condition of the patients to detect any 
serious deterioration during, or due to, the radiation therapy course (Kutcher 
et al., 1994: 608). 
 
It is important to be aware of the HIV status of the patient, as this can affect 
side effects experienced by the patient during the radiation treatment. The 
knowledge of the HIV status is important for the safety of the personnel at 
the radiation treatment units, as well.  
 
5.4.3.5. Patient Identification 
As with the simulation (5.4.1.1.), when a patient arrives at the radiation 
treatment unit on the first day of treatment, it is important to determine if the 
correct patient is to receive radiation treatment. Thus, the correct patient 
has to be identified. This should be done by asking the patient what his / her 
name is. If it is the correct name, the identification number and address of 
the patient has to be confirmed, as well.  
 
On the first day of the radiation treatment, the radiation therapist in charge 
of briefing the patient has to inform the patient about the radiation therapy 
procedures at the radiation treatment unit and the necessary bathing 
instructions have to be explained to the patient, as well. A photograph of the 
patient is taken, which is then attached to the radiation treatment file, to 
facilitate in the identification of the patient (Kutcher et al., 1994: 608). 
 
Due to language barriers and the fact that some patients are in a hurry and 
want to be treated as soon as possible, it is probable that a wrong patient 
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may enter the radiation treatment room when a name is called. Thus, the 
identification of the patient has to be verified every single day, during the 
remainder of the radiation therapy course.  
 
5.4.3.6. Radiation Treatment Execution 
Before the patient enters the radiation treatment room, the identification of 
the patient has to be verified again. All the patient support and 
immobilisation devices, as described in the simulator set-up notes have to 
be controlled. The patient is then set-up in the described radiation treatment 
set-up position. The tattoo location has to be verified, together with the 
location of the radiation treatment field. The correct source surface distance 
has to be set-up and verified, whether it is isocentric or on a distance of 
100cm.  
 
The field parameters have to be checked and verified. These parameters 
include field size, gantry position, collimator position and table position. If 
there are any special treatment devices, like bite-blocks, tongue depressors, 
bolus or shielding, they have to be verified, checked and correctly applied. 
When all of the above checks have been performed and corresponds to the 
record-and-verify system, the radiation treatment may commence (Kutcher 
et al., 1994: 597). 
       
5.4.3.7. Electronic Portal Images (EPI) 
With the first radiation treatment of each patient, an electronic portal image 
has to be taken of each radiation treatment field, to verify relative positional 
aspects of the treatment field. The image is created as a control image of 
the radiation treatment area to compare with the x-ray images supplied by 
the simulator during the simulation of the patient or with the digitally 
reconstructed radiographs (DRR) supplied by the radiation treatment 
planning unit, if the patient is receiving radiation treatment on a three-
dimensional isocentric plan. The EPI image is verified by the radiation 
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therapist in charge and if it is within acceptable limits according to 
departmental protocol, the radiation treatment may be given (Thwaites et 
al., 1995: 70) (Kutcher et al., 1994: 611). 
 
5.4.3.8. In Vivo Measurements 
Within the first three radiation treatments, In Vivo measurements have to be 
done to control the given dose that the patient is receiving and the overall 
dosimetry of treatment delivery. The measurements are taken by attaching 
a diode to the skin surface of the patient directly in the centre of the 
radiation field. The given radiation dose is then measured during radiation 
therapy and recorded on the In Vivo forms. The medical physicist has to 
control the measured readings and verify that they are within acceptable 
limits (Thwaites et al., 1995: 70) (Kutcher et al., 1994: 599). 
. 
5.4.3.9. Record Keeping 
The record keeping in the radiation therapy file is essential, as it follows the 
progress of the radiation treatment that the patient is receiving. The daily 
and the cumulative dose have to be annotated. The radiation therapists who 
perform the radiation therapy on that day have to initialise the radiation 
treatment file. 
  
There are two verifications that have to be done: a primary verification, 
which has to be performed within the first three days of the radiation 
treatment; the second verification that is a daily verification, has to be 
carried out every day. In the next section, both verifications will be briefly 
explained. 
 
5.4.3.9.1. Primary Verification 
A primary check has to be performed and recorded to establish if the names 
and initials of all the personnel who initial the radiation treatment file are 
present. Then it has to be verified, that the electronic portal images and the In 
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Vivo dosimetry were done and the images and In Vivo forms are present and 
signed by the oncologist and physicist, respectively. Where applicable, the 
form indicating that the check films for the MCPs where done and signed by 
the physicist and the oncologist, has to be controlled. The radiation treatment 
file has to be controlled and signed by the medical physicist, within the first 
three radiation treatments (Kutcher et al., 1994: 609). 
   
5.4.3.9.2. Daily Check 
The daily records that have to be kept and performed include the 
documentation of:  
 the radiation treatment unit;  
 the radiation treatment modality;  
 the radiation treatment energy;  
 the daily and cumulative radiation dose, that the patient is receiving;  
 the monitor unit settings for each field have to be checked for 
consistency with the simulator parameters, and recorded;  
 the initials of the radiation therapists responsible for the radiation 
treatment on the day and for the completion of the daily record  have 
to be recorded (Ali, Haselhorst & Foster, 1998:44) (Kutcher et al., 
1994: 609). 
 
5.4.4. SECTION D – WEEKLY REVIEW 
 
5.4.4.1. Overview 
The radiation treatment file should be reviewed weekly. This weekly review 
is required to determine if all the necessary verifications and controls were 
performed and whether they were performed correctly, as will be described 
below.  As part of the weekly chart review, the reviewer should determine if 
any new fields have been created, or any previously treated fields modified.  
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All modified fields as well as new treatment fields, should be carefully 
reviewed, as described in Section C. The date of the previous weekly review 
should be checked to see if the interval between the chart reviews is 
appropriate, or whether it should be brought to the radiation unit 
supervisor’s attention. It is recommended that the same reviewer does not 
check a radiation treatment chart two weeks in a row, as this creates an 
opportunity for incorrect data to elude the quality control system (Kutcher et 
al., 1994: 609). The following sub-categories should be checked as well: 
 
5.4.4.2. Simulator / Set-up Page 
The simulator / set-up page should be reviewed just as it was with the initial 
verification (5.4.3.1.). The set-up page should be reviewed for each field to 
determine whether the necessary information was accurately and clearly 
indicated. Bearing in mind that this information is applied in the execution of 
the radiation therapy of the patient, it is very important that the information 
presented is accurate and sufficient and interpreted and applied correctly, 
as well (NRC, 1995: 9) (Kutcher et al., 1994: 610). 
. 
5.4.4.3. Radiation Treatment Prescription 
The radiation treatment prescription has to be reviewed continually during 
the weekly overviews. This weekly review should be done according to the 
initial radiation treatment prescription control that was performed (5.4.3.2.) 
(Kutcher et al., 1994: 595) (Thwaites et al., 1995: 69). 
  
5.4.4.4. Radiation Monitor Units (MU) Calculation 
The monitor units entered into the record-and-verify system of the radiation 
treatment unit have to be critically reviewed every week. This review has to 
be performed in the same way in which the initial verification was done 
(5.4.3.3.). This weekly review is performed to ensure that no incorrect 
monitor unit goes through the radiation treatment procedure, undetected 
(Kutcher et al., 1994: 598,607) (Thwaites et al., 1995: 69). 
 99 
5.4.4.5. Electronic Portal Images (EPI) 
It has to be reviewed whether the EPIs were done and whether they were 
within acceptable limits (5.4.3.7) and duly signed by the oncologist 
(Thwaites et al., 1995: 70) (Kutcher et al., 1994: 611). 
 
5.4.4.6. In vivo Measurements 
It has to be reviewed if the in vivo measurements were done and whether 
they were within acceptable limits and duly signed by the medical physicist 
(Kutcher et al., 1994: 611). 
 
5.4.4.7. Record Keeping 
The weekly review is an overall review of all the previous controls that were 
expected to be performed. Thus, the recordkeeping has to be reviewed in 
the same manner as the initial review (5.4.3.9.). The record keeping in the 
radiation therapy file is crucial, as it follows the progress of the radiation 
treatment that the patient is receiving. Two checks, namely the primary 
verification and the daily verification are performed (Holmberg & McClean, 
2002: 16). 
 
5.4.4.7.1. Primary Verification 
A primary check has to be performed and recorded to establish if the names 
and initials of all the personnel, who signed the radiation treatment file, are 
present. Then, it has to be verified that the electronic portal images and the In 
Vivo dosimetry were done and the images and In Vivo forms are present and 
signed by the oncologist and physicist, respectively. Where applicable, the 
form indicating that the check films for the MCPs where done and signed by 
the physicist and the oncologist, has to be controlled. The radiation treatment 
file has to be controlled and signed by the medical physicist, within the first 
three radiation treatments (Holmberg & McClean, 2002: 16) (Kutcher et al., 
1994: 611). 
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5.4.4.7.2. Daily Verification 
The daily records that have to be kept have to be controlled, to ascertain 
whether the necessary information was documented on a daily basis 
(5.4.3.9.2.) (Kutcher et al., 1994: 611). 
     
The recurrent chart-checking theme is to verify that all parameters are 
consistent, from the radiation treatment prescription through to the radiation 
treatment plan, to the simulator sheet, to the MU calculation, to the daily 
radiation treatment execution and record keeping.  
 
5.4.5. SECTION E – ADVERSE INCIDENTS 
 
5.4.5.1. Discovery of an Adverse Incident 
Upon the discovery of an adverse incident, the adverse incident report form 
has to be completed (3.2.1.). The adverse incident then has to be reported 
to the oncologist in charge of the patient. After discussion with the 
oncologist, the adverse incident has to be rectified where and if possible 
(Holmberg & McClean, 2002: 16). 
 
5.4.6. SECTION F – REVIEW AT COMPLETION OF TREATMENT 
 
5.4.6.1. Final Review 
As a final review, before the chart is placed in a file, the following items 
should be checked. The total radiation dose delivered has to be checked, to 
ascertain if it matches the prescribed radiation dose. The chart has to be 
checked to see if all the proper documentation were done (record keeping). 
A printed radiation treatment summary of the radiation dose delivered has to 
be included (Kutcher et al., 1994: 611). 
 
This section of the chapter provided the narration of the quality control 
procedure manual. The next section of the chapter will provide the 
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limitations of the study, as well as recommendations and the final 
conclusion. 
 
5.5. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
Limitations experienced during this study, were definitely the availability of 
literature on this specific subject and the support of the personnel at the 
department.  As stated in 2.1 several searches e.g. literature searches, 
internet searches and Nexus searches, were performed to locate related 
published studies. Although an abundance of literature information of 
general quality assurance in radiation therapy and quality assurance, 
specially aimed at radiation physics and physicists were identified, very few 
related published studies, specifically on the analysis of incidents during 
radiation therapy of cancer patients, were found. Only a total of six related 
published studies that were applicable on this study, were found. 
 
Patton et al., (2003: 50) support this statement by stating that there are 
many publications under the general label of radiation therapy errors, which 
do not address medical mistakes, but instead deal with set-up uncertainties 
during patient treatment: patient positioning, organ motion, set-up error, and 
radiation dose determination each possess an extensive literature. In 
contrast, reports addressing radiation therapy treatment mistakes, or 
incidents, are relatively few.  
 
Another limitation could be ascribed to the attitude of the radiation 
therapists. The personnel at the department were very sceptical and 
negative about the study. They felt that the adverse incidents would be 
labelled to people and interpreted as mistakes. In addition, to worsen 
matters, their ‘mistakes’ would then be put under a magnifying glass. 
However, they soon realised that this was not the case. As stated by Leer, 
Corver, Kraus, v.d. Togt & Buruma (1995: 81) it is important that the 
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personnel as a whole becomes aware of the quality control process and that 
they are stimulated to participate. The first reaction to the study, the 
reporting of the adverse incidents and the discussions, were not always very 
positive, as was the case with Leer et al., (1995: 81). Some personnel at the 
department felt that work methods were adequately organised as they were 
and that further regulations were not necessary and could even be counter 
productive.  
 
In line with Leer et al., (1995: 81) once the discussions actually started and 
the study came into affect, different opinions were detected and the process 
became clearer. This in turn, has led to the motivation of more frankness 
and can also lead to increased efficiency and improvement in the quality of 
radiation care that the patients are receiving at the department. The 
personnel also realised that high quality and correct work can be verified by 
consistent and regularly performed, physical quality control. The increased 
motivation during the work is to the ultimate benefit of the patient (Roth et 
al., 1998: 87). Even though there was a positive change in the radiation 
therapists’ attitude it is still possible that some adverse incidents are not 
reported. 
 
5.6. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
To perform a study that focuses on the errs of human ways in their 
professional surroundings, in a manner of speaking, is not an easy feat. 
Moreover, if these professional surroundings are highly technological 
equipment that are utilised in specialised complex radiation treatment for 
cancer patients and the personnel has to identify and report the incidents, it 
can be a very sensitive study. 
 
Thus, it was of utmost importance that the objectives and the goals of the 
study were communicated thoroughly and meticulously to the personnel 
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involved, before the study commenced. The aim of the study, the method of 
the study and the significance of the study, should be well known to all 
involved. It is also of utmost importance to stress the fact that the intended 
goal of the study is to confirm the effectiveness and quality of the radiation 
therapy received by the patient and furthermore enhance these aspects, if 
required. The personnel involved must understand that the purpose of the 
incident reports is to identify potential and actual risks of inaccurate 
radiation therapy, and to eliminate adverse radiation therapy incidents 
(Dunn, 2003: 63), and not to focus attention on mistakes that they might 
have made.  
 
Management can play a very important role in the improvement of the 
existing quality system of a department. Enlightened leadership can instill 
the desire to improve quality care and can provide the means, in both 
structure and support, to accomplish this (Kutcher et al., 1994: 582). The 
outcome of radiation therapy is dependant on effective teamwork because 
radiation therapy relies on a multi-functional, multi-disciplinary team. 
Management needs to focus on the organisation, structure and control of 
quality control tasks, to motivate innovation and improvement of the quality 
control system. Management also needs to encourage confidence amongst 
the radiation therapists and enhances an open-door policy, so that radiation 
therapists feel comfortable to discuss new ideas and solutions. All ideas, 
even those that fail, can create opportunity for knowledge and better 
understanding (Kehoe & Rugg, 1999: 284). 
 
The outcome of this study was the compilation of the quality control 
procedure manual, specially designed for radiation therapists. The present 
study can be extended by the implementation of this designed quality 
control procedure manual. The influence of the quality control procedure 
manual on the flow and structure of the radiation tasks and procedures 
performed by the personnel can be monitored. The subsequent influence on 
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the incidence of the adverse radiation incidents and the overall quality of the 
radiation therapy received by patients can be investigated as a future 
research project.  
 
5.7. FINAL CONCLUSION 
 
The final objective of the study was to compile QC methods in a QC 
procedure manual. The manual was designed to minimise the occurrence 
and consequences of any events, which could subsequently lead to adverse 
radiation incidents, which could potentially affect the outcome of patient 
treatment (Leer et al., 1998: 74). 
 
The study contributed to the advancement of the quality control 
management system at the Oncotherapy Department, Universitas Annexe, 
Bloemfontein, with the focus on the radiation treatment delivery process. 
Information obtained from the study was used in conjunction with 
information obtained from the literature study, as a basis in the compilation 
and design of a quality control procedure manual for the department. Once 
implemented, procedures and / or protocols in this manual will be able to 
assist in more accurate, effective and higher quality, radiation treatment 
delivery. 
 
This quality control procedure manual includes the responsibilities of 
radiation therapists regarding quality control procedures during the course 
of radiation treatment of a patient. This quality control procedure manual, 
together with the adverse incident report will provide the department with an 
effective method of reporting adverse incidents and finding ways of 
improving radiation treatment delivery, with the minimum number of adverse 
incidents. 
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Thus, in a combined effort from all the radiation personnel at the 
department, the research objectives were achieved, through the monitoring 
of the origin and frequency of the adverse incidents, adverse incident 
discussions and literature reviews. Through the execution of the study, the 
quality control procedure manual for radiation therapists at Universitas 
Annexe has been compiled to assist and guide in the delivery of radiation 
therapy of the highest standard at the Oncotherapy department. 
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UNIVERSITAS ANNEXE RADIATION THERAPY 
 
Adverse Incident Report 
 
RT. Nr:       Date:     
Modality + Energy:      Plan/ Opp /Single field 
Prescribed Dose:     Number #:   
Prescribing doctor:     
 
Adverse incident reported to:          
Description of adverse incident:       
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
             
Reason:           
            
             
Corrective actions:         
            
            
             
Preventative action:         
            
            
             
 
Adverse incident reported to doctor:         
Reporting radiation therapist:          
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Data Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treatment 
Unit 
Malfunction 
 
Dose 
Calculation 
Error 
Incorrect 
Field 
Positioning 
Patient 
Positioning 
Radiation 
Treatment 
Energy 
Shielding 
  
 
Major 
 
 
Minor 
 
 
Major 
 
 
Minor 
 
 
Major 
 
 
Minor 
 
 
Major 
 
 
Minor 
 
 
Major 
 
 
Minor 
 
 
Major 
 
 
Minor 
Jan 
  
 
  
 
        
Feb 
            
Mar 
            
Apr 
            
May 
            
Jun 
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Monthly distribution of reported adverse incidents in the various 
categories.  
 
 
Month Incident Major/Minor Correction 
January 
1. DCE Minor √ 
2. DTE Minor X 
    
February 1. FP Minor X 
    
March 
1. DCE Minor X 
2. RE Minor X 
    
April 
1. TUM Minor √ 
2. DCE Minor √ 
3. DTE Minor √ 
4. IP Minor X 
    
May 1. DCE Minor √ 
    
June 
1. DCE Minor √ 
2. IS Minor √ 
3. FP Minor X 
4.PP Minor √ 
5. IS Minor X 
 
data transfer error (DTE), dose calculation error (DCE); incorrect field 
positioning (FP); incorrect patient (IP); incorrect patient positioning (PP); 
incorrect radiation energy (RE); incorrect shielding (IS); treatment unit 
malfunction (TUM) 
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MINUTES OF THE MEETINGS 
 
1. MEETING HELD ON 7 MARCH 2007 (1/2007) 
 
1.1. January 2007 
 
1.1.1. Reported Adverse Incidents 
 
Adverse incident 1: The dose calculation for the radiation treatment was 
done for 200cGy fractions while 180cGy fractions were prescribed. The 
patient received 5 fractions radiation treatment on this dose. A correction 
was made for the adverse incident by compensating for the additional dose. 
 
Adverse incident 2: Due to a change in the patient’s separation 
measurement, the dose monitor units were altered after the patient returned 
for the second course radiation. It went unnoticed at the treatment unit and 
the patient received seven fractions radiation treatment with this radiation 
dose. The patient completed this specific segment of his radiation treatment 
and no correction could be made.  
 
1.1.2. Opinions of the radiation therapists on the factors influencing 
the occurrence of adverse incidents    
 
The radiation therapists felt that the heavy workload and the shortage of 
personnel played a major role in the occurrence of adverse incidents. Due 
to the continuous heavy workload, some patients were only simulated for 
their radiation therapy in the late afternoon and then it was expected that 
they would start with their radiation treatment on the same day. The 
radiation therapists commented that the starting of a new patient in the last 
few minutes of a workday put extra pressure on the already overworked 
radiation treatment units and the personnel and created an environment for 
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adverse incidents to occur. Opinions were also aired that new students did 
not possess the required knowledge to perform duties accurately and 
needed constant monitoring, assistance and attention.  
 
1.1.3. Preventative Steps 
 
The radiation therapists decided that no patients are to start with their 
radiation treatment before all the necessary verification checks have not 
been performed. These verification checks include the dose calculation 
checks and the secondary checks on the information that was entered into 
the computerised record-and-verify system at the radiation treatment unit. 
 
1.2. February 2007  
 
1.2.1. Reported Adverse Incidents 
 
A patient received a radiation treatment plan with electron fields. With the 
set-up of the patient during treatment, the collimation degrees were altered 
and did not correspond with the instructions received from the treatment 
planning unit on the patients’ treatment plan. The patient received two 
fractions radiation treatment with the incorrect collimator angle. It was not 
possible to correct this adverse incident. 
 
1.2.2. Opinions of the radiation therapists on the factors influencing 
the occurrence of adverse incidents    
 
No explanation could be given for the occurrence of this adverse incident. 
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1.2.3. Preventative Steps 
 
If there are any queries or doubts about a prescription or radiation treatment 
set-up at the start of or during the radiation treatment of a patient, the 
relevant personnel, be it the oncologist, the planning radiation therapist or 
the simulator radiation therapist, has to be contacted and consulted on the 
matter. This needs to be done to clarify any uncertainties regarding the 
radiation treatment of the patient. 
 
2. MEETING HELD ON 9 MAY 2007 (2/2007) 
 
2.1. March 2007  
 
2.1.1. Reported Adverse Incidents 
 
Adverse incident 1: A dose distribution was done for the isodose curve of 
115% while the oncologist prescribed the radiation dose on the isodose 
curve of 110%. The patient received one fraction radiation treatment with 
this radiation dose. No correction was made for this adverse incident 
because the deviation from the prescribed radiation treatment was 
miniscule. 
 
Adverse incident 2: The patient received orthovoltage radiation treatment. 
The patient received two fractions radiation treatment with 250KV radiation 
energy instead of the prescribed 100KV radiation energy. The adverse 
incident was atoned for by decreasing the total number of radiation fraction 
treatments, to achieve the same result.  
 
2.1.2. Opinions of the radiation therapists on the factors influencing 
the occurrence of adverse incidents    
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The first incident was once again a case of a heavy workload, shortage of 
personnel and the rush to start the patients with their radiation treatment. 
 
No comments were given about the second adverse incident. 
 
2.1.3. Preventative Steps 
 
Once again, if there are any queries or doubts about a prescription or 
radiation treatment set-up, or if the radiation therapist responsible for the 
carrying out of the oncologists prescription does not agree with the radiation 
treatment prescription, the relevant personnel, be it the oncologist, the 
planning radiation therapist or the simulator radiation therapist, has to be 
contacted and consulted on the matter, before any changes are made to the 
radiation treatment.  
 
2.2. APRIL 2007 
 
2.2.1. Reported Adverse Incidents 
 
Adverse incident 1: The treatment unit did not call up the last field in the 
patients’ radiation treatment sequence and the controller did not notice that 
all the radiation fields had not been given. The patient received one fraction 
radiation treatment like this. The adverse incident was rectified by delivering 
this radiation field at a later stage in the radiation therapy course. 
 
Adverse incident 2: The dose calculation was done incorrectly at the 
simulator and it was not checked at the radiation treatment unit before the 
patient received his first radiation treatment. The patient received one 
fraction radiation treatment on this dose. The adverse incident was 
corrected the following day, by compensating for the imprecise radiation 
dose.    
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Adverse incident 3: The monitor units were erroneously entered into the 
radiation treatment unit record-and-verify system and were not checked 
before the patient received radiation treatment. The patient received one 
fraction radiation treatment on this dose. The adverse incident was 
corrected the following day, by compensating for the imprecise radiation 
dose 
 
Adverse incident 4: The patient entered the radiation treatment room when 
another patient was called and the radiation therapist did not notice. The 
patient thus received one fraction radiation treatment on another patient’s 
radiation treatment plan. No correction could be made for this adverse 
incident. 
 
2.2.2. Opinions of the radiation therapists on the factors influencing 
the occurrence of adverse incidents    
 
The shortage of personnel and the high workload played a role in the 
occurrence of these incidents as well. Another factor was all the public 
holidays like the Easter weekend and Freedom Day and the fact that many 
of the patients wanted to go home over these periods. This resulted in a 
situation where some patients were receiving radiation treatments twice 
daily and thus, putting even more strain on the personnel and on the 
radiation treatment units.  
 
It was also noted that the occurrence of adverse incidents increased when 
one of the radiation treatment units broke down and the patients had to be 
distributed amongst the remaining radiation treatment units. The distribution 
of the patients between the radiation treatment units necessitated the 
calculation of new applicable doses and the patients’ radiation treatment 
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information had to be entered into the newly allocated radiation treatment 
unit’s computerised record-and-verify system.  
 
They also observed that radiation therapist rotation on the radiation 
treatment units could affect the occurrence of adverse incidents. This could 
be attributed to the fact that the newly rotated personnel were not familiar 
with the patients or their radiation treatment set-up. The same scenario 
occurs when a radiation treatment unit breaks down and the personnel of 
the affected unit have to work on other units. Thus, the patients may be 
treated by radiation therapists who are not familiar with their radiation 
treatment set-up.  
 
2.2.3. Preventative Steps 
 
The radiation therapists working at the simulator should double-check each 
other on the simulator set-up instructions and the calculated monitor units 
before the radiation treatment files are passed on to the radiation treatment 
units. 
 
Patient identification is very important. Make sure that there are 
photographs on the treatment files and control name and birth date.  
 
No patient should start their radiation treatment before all the necessary 
verification checks have been performed. This is significant for patients 
currently busy with their radiation treatment course, but who have to be 
moved to another radiation treatment unit, due to radiation treatment unit 
malfunction. These verification checks include the dose calculation checks 
and the secondary checks on the information that was entered into the 
computerised record-and-verify system at the radiation treatment unit. 
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3. MEETING HELD ON 4 JULY 2007 (3/2007) 
 
3.1. May 2007  
 
3.1.1. Reported Adverse Incidents 
 
Adverse incident 1: The monitor units were erroneously entered into the 
radiation treatment unit record-and-verify system and were not checked 
before the patient received radiation treatment. The patient received one 
fraction radiation treatment on this dose. The erroneous dose was 
compensated for in the next fraction radiation treatment. 
 
3.1.2. Opinions of the radiation therapists on the factors influencing 
the occurrence of this adverse incident    
 
The shortage of personnel and the high workload played a role in the 
occurrence of this incident as well. 
 
3.1.3. Preventative steps 
 
No patient should start radiation treatment before all the necessary 
verification checks have been performed. This is significant for patients 
currently busy with their radiation treatment course but who have to be 
moved to another radiation treatment unit, due to radiation treatment unit 
malfunction. These verification checks include the dose calculation check 
and the secondary check on the information that was entered into the 
computerised record-and-verify system at the radiation treatment unit. 
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3.2. JUNE 2007 
 
3.2.1. Reported Adverse Incidents 
 
Adverse incident 1: The monitor units were incorrectly entered into the 
radiation treatment unit RV system and were not checked before the patient 
received his first radiation treatment. The patient received one fraction 
radiation treatment on this dose. The adverse incident was corrected by 
compensating for this radiation dose at the next fraction radiation treatment. 
 
Adverse incident 2: The patient received treatment with extra shielding as if 
he were being treated with off-cord fields, while he was supposed to be 
treated with normal big fields with lead shielding of the cerebellum. The 
patient received one fraction radiation treatment like this. The adverse 
incident was corrected by deducting one fraction radiation dose from the 
original prescription of this specific segment of his radiation treatment 
course. 
 
Adverse incident 3: The isocentre coordinates were described incorrectly in 
the simulator instructions. The error was discovered with the electronic 
portal imaging. The patient received two fractions radiation treatment on this 
set-up. No correction could be made for this adverse incident. 
 
Adverse incident 4: A child was marked for brain and spine radiation 
treatment. With the marking of the booster fields it was discovered that his 
radiation treatment set-up position differed slightly from the original position. 
This was due to the fact that the child was scared, stressed and crying 
during the marking and immobilisation process. As his radiation treatment 
course progressed he started to trust the process and relaxed. This caused 
an alteration of 5 mm in the position of his neck which in turn caused an 
important part of the target volume to be shielded. Two additional radiation 
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fields were given together with his booster fields over the target volume to 
compensate for the lost radiation dose.   
 
Adverse incident 5: The lead shielding tray was made incorrectly. Too much 
of the target volume was shielded during the patients’ first fraction radiation 
treatment. No correction could be made for this adverse incident.      
 
3.2.2. Opinions of the radiation therapists on the factors influencing 
the occurrence of adverse incidents    
 
The radiation therapists observed that the occurrence of the reported 
adverse incidents were at their highest in flu season when many of the 
personnel were ill or on sick-leave. They felt that illness could lead to a lack 
of concentration and a decline in productivity. 
 
The shortage of personnel increased in June, due to the fact that the 
students were writing examinations. The fact that the radiation treatment 
units are under pressure to start the patients with their treatment, even if it’s 
late in the afternoon, creates an environment for incidents to occur. 
 
3.2.3. Preventative Steps 
 
The radiation therapists working at the simulator should double-check each 
other on the simulator set-up instructions and the calculated monitor units 
before the radiation treatment files are passed on to the radiation treatment 
units. Once again, no patients should start with their radiation treatment 
before all the necessary verification checks have been performed.  
 
Any shielding accessories e.g. lead blocks, MCPs and multi-leaf collimation 
have to be verified before the radiation therapy of the patient commences. 
When a new patient starts with radiation therapy, the radiation therapists 
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who do the first radiation set-up and treatment have to carry out the first 
radiation treatment completely. This is done to check for any irregularities 
during the radiation treatment session and between the individual radiation 
treatment fields. 
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Quality Control Procedure Manual 
For Radiation Therapists 
 
THIS MANUAL CONTAINS THE QUALITY CONTROL CHECKS 
which will be continuously implemented by: 
 
 
 
 
Facility Name: Oncotherapy Department, Universitas Annexe, Bloemfontein  
 
Address:      Oncotherapy Department 
      National Hospital 
      Roth Lane 
      Willows 
      Bloemfontein 
      Free State 
      South Africa 
 
 
Date Completed:  2009 
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SECTION A 
 
SIMULATOR 
 
1. Patient Identification 
 
When a patient arrives at the simulator it is important to determine if it is the 
correct patient who is going to be simulated.  
 
               Y  N NA 
1.1. Patient name                     
1.2. ID                
1.3. Address               
1.4. Signed and witnessed consent form            
 
2. Initial physical evaluation of patient and pertinent clinical 
information  
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The initial clinical evaluation of a patient file and pertinent clinical 
information encompasses a thorough assessment of the patient’s diagnosis 
to verify that the correct procedure is going to be performed. 
  
               Y  N NA 
2.1. Diagnosis of disease             
2.2. Stage of disease              
2.3. History               
2.4. Pertinent pathology report             
2.5. Positive histology               
2.6. HIV status               
2.7. Physical condition              
 
 
 
 
3. Previously treated or concurrently treated volumes in which dose 
can overlap with the current treatment volume 
 
The patient’s file has to be checked to determine if the patient has received 
previous radiation therapy. If s/he has received previous radiation treatment, 
the simulator films of the previously treated area have to be located and 
reviewed to establish any potential overlap with the current radiation 
treatment site.   
 
               Y N NA 
3.1. Review simulator films to locate potential overlap         
3.2. Review isodose distributions to locate potential overlap       
3.3. Determine max cumulative dose in the overlap region         
3.4. 0,5 cm separation between adjacent fields          
3.5. Calculate cumulative dose to any other special points         
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3.6. Request In vivo measurements where appropriate         
 
4. Simulator Room Initial Set-up 
 
When a patient is to be simulated at the simulator, the simulator room has to 
be prepared according to the localisation that is going to be performed. The 
standard set-up of the simulator unit has to be done and/or controlled.  
  
               Y  N NA 
4.1. Gantry 0°                
4.2. Collimator 90°              
4.3. Bed rotation 0°              
4.4. Magnification factor 1.5             
4.5. Correct patient support and immobilization devices         
4.6. Correct patient positioning             
4.7. Source surface distance 100cm            
4.8. Isocentric treatment technique                
4.9. Specified fields              
5. Simulation Set-up Notes 
 
After the simulation of the patient is completed, it is very important to 
transfer all the information regarding the patient set-up, the field parameters 
and the radiation treatment regime, to the patient radiation treatment file, 
which is given to the radiation treatment unit where the patient receives 
his/her radiation therapy.  
 
               Y  N NA 
5.1. Patient parameters              
5.2. Patient treatment position             
5.3. Patient support and immobilisation devices          
5.4. Setup instructions              
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5.5. Anatomical location of tattoos            
5.6. All physical beam parameters             
5.7. Field size               
5.8. Separation               
5.9. Source surface distance 100cm            
5.10. Isocentric treatment technique                
5.11. Lead blocks/MLC              
5.12. Wax build-up               
5.13. Bite-block / Tongue depressor            
5.14. Radiation therapists              
5.15. Double-check by another radiation therapist          
5.16. Initials of simulation radiation therapists           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Radiation Treatment Prescription 
 
Upon the completion of the simulation of the patient, the radiation treatment 
prescription is completed by the oncologist in charge of the patient.  
 
               Y  N NA 
6.1. Treatment site              
6.2. Treatment mode              
6.3. Treatment energy              
6.4. Treatment field              
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6.5. Given dose / Fractionation             
6.6. Central dose / percentage             
6.7. Field size               
6.8. Source surface distance 100cm            
6.9. Isocentric treatment technique                
6.10. Daily dose, total dose and fractionation scheme         
6.11. Prescription has been signed and dated by oncologist         
6.12. Prescription changes have been signed and dated         
6.13. Departmental guidelines followed            
 
7. Radiation Monitor Units (MU) Calculation 
 
For opposing radiation fields, the monitor units have to be calculated and 
checked before the radiation treatment file is handed over to the radiation 
treatment unit. 
 
                  Y N NA 
7.1. Daily dose fractionation calculated is correct          
7.2. MU consistent with total dose / fractionation scheme         
7.3. Correct factors and parameters used           
7.4. Correct radiation treatment unit            
7.5. Correct radiation treatment modality           
7.6. Correct field size / calculated equivalent square         
7.7. Correct radiation treatment energy           
7.8. Correct patient separation             
7.9. Source surface distance 100cm            
7.10. Isocentric treatment technique                
7.11. If beam blocking is extensive, the appropriate 
equivalent square calculations have been made         
7.12. If use of bolus is extensive, the appropriate 
separation has to be used             
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SECTION B 
 
PLANNING UNIT 
  
Three Dimensional Conformal Radiation Treatment Planning 
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When the CT images of the patient are received and transferred to the 
radiation treatment planning unit, there are several factors that should be 
controlled before, during and after the radiation treatment planning process. 
 
1. The Scanner Form  
 
The scanner form is received from the CT unit and has to be controlled for 
all the information regarding the patient, the patient setup and the radiation 
treatment protocol. 
 
Y N NA 
1.1. Patient name and identification                
1.2. Patient orientation                 
1.3. Patient parameters                 
1.4. Simulator and setup instructions               
1.5. Radiation treatment unit            
1.6. Contours are drawn in                
1.7. PTV drawn in             
1.8. Consultant signature at PTV           
1.9. Prescription within department protocol          
 
2. Treatment Planning Preparation 
 
Before any planning can commence the patient identification and radiation 
therapy method has to be controlled. 
 
 
Y N NA 
2.1. Correct directory                  
2.2. Teletherapy                  
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2.3. Correct patient                 
2.4. Control RT number and patient name              
2.5. Place marker correctly on tattoo                
 
3. Treatment Planning Process 
 
The radiation beams are positioned and/or adjusted to deliver the required 
dose to the planning target volume while sparing the normal surrounding 
tissue and critical structures. 
Y N NA 
3.1. Correct treatment field description              
3.2. Correct treatment unit                
3.3. Correct treatment method – SAD / SSD              
3.4. Correct placing of isocentre               
3.5. Correct gantry angles                 
3.6. Correct collimator degrees                
3.7. Correct fieldsizes                 
3.8. Correct normalization point               
3.9. Correct isodose curves                
3.10. Correct orientation of wedges               
3.11. Correct application of shielding               
 
4. Treatment Plan Evaluation 
 
The plan must be evaluated to ascertain whether the PTV are covered 
accurately and adequately by the radiation dose. 
Y N NA 
4.1. Adequate coverage of PTV               
4.2. Adequate coverage on superior / inferior slices             
4.3. Maximum dose ≤ 107% of prescribed radiation dose        
4.4. Minimum dose ≥ 95% of prescribed radiation dose        
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4.5. Dose to critical organs within tolerance          
 
5. Dose Calculation 
 
The dose delivered to the PTV is calculated according to the prescription 
and the isodose line selected by the oncologist to determine the treatment 
unit monitor units. 
  
Y N NA 
5.1. Correct fractions                 
5.2. Correct isodose line                 
5.3. Correct total dose             
 
6. Print-out Preparation 
 
After completion of the plan and approval by the oncologist a graphical print-
out is made which is then given to the radiation treatment unit together with 
the patients’ radiation treatment file. 
 
Y N NA 
6.1. Graphical print-out of 3DCRTP               
6.2. Patient name and identification                
6.3. Patient orientation                 
6.4. Patient parameters                 
6.5. Simulator and setup instructions               
6.6. All physical beam parameters           
6.7. Computerised MU calculation work sheet         
6.8. Selected isodose percentage indicated          
6.9. Additional bolus, MLCs, lead shielding indicated        
6.10. Signed by planning radiation therapist          
6.11. Oncologist authorisation            
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SECTION C 
 
RADIATION TREATMENT UNITS 
 
The radiation treatment file should be thoroughly evaluated before the data 
is entered into the record-and-verify system of the radiation unit and the 
radiation treatment of the patient commences.  
 
1. Simulator / Setup Page 
 
The simulator/setup page should be reviewed for each field to determine 
whether the necessary information is accurately and clearly indicated.  
 
     Y  N NA 
1.1. Patient parameters              
1.2. Patient treatment position             
1.3. Patient support and immobilisation devices          
1.4. Setup instructions              
1.5. Anatomical location of tattoos            
1.6. All physical beam parameters             
1.7. Field size               
1.8. Separation               
1.9. Source surface distance 100cm            
1.10. Isocentric treatment technique                
1.11. Lead blocks/MLC              
1.12. Wax build-up               
1.13. Bite-block / Tongue depressor            
1.14. Initials of simulation radiation therapists           
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2. Radiation Treatment Prescription 
 
With the completion of the simulation of the patient, the radiation treatment 
prescription is completed by the oncologist in charge of the patient.  
 
               Y  N NA 
2.1. Treatment site              
2.2. Treatment mode              
2.3. Treatment energy              
2.4. Treatment field              
2.5. Given dose / Fractionation             
2.6. Central dose / percentage             
2.7. Field size               
2.8. Source surface distance 100cm            
2.9. Isocentric treatment technique                
2.10. Daily dose, total dose and fractionation scheme         
2.11. Prescription has been signed and dated by oncologist         
2.12. Prescription changes have been signed and dated         
2.13. Departmental guidelines followed            
 
3. Radiation Monitor Units (MU) Calculation 
 
Before the monitor units are entered into the record-and-verify system of the 
radiation unit, it has to be reviewed.  
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              Y  N NA  
3.1. Daily dose fractionation calculated is correct          
3.2. MU consistent with total dose / fractionation scheme         
3.3. Correct radiation treatment unit            
3.4. Correct radiation treatment modality           
3.5. Correct field size / calculated equivalent square         
3.6. Correct radiation treatment energy           
3.7. Correct patient separation             
3.8. Source surface distance 100cm            
3.9. Isocentric treatment technique                
3.10. If beam blocking is extensive, the appropriate 
equivalent square calculations have been made         
3.11. If use of bolus is extensive, the appropriate 
separation has to be used             
3.12. Hot spots 3D plans calculated and documented         
3.13. MU indicated on the daily record for a particular field  
corresponds to the correct MU calculation          
3.14. Correct output factor used for electron beam treatments      
3.15. Correct output factor used for single beam treatments         
3.16. Beam and patient parameters used for the calculation  
are consistent with those listed on the simulator  
setup sheet and/or treatment plan           
3.17. MU calculations have been reviewed           
3.18. Correct factors and parameters used           
 
This information should then be meticulously entered into the record-and-
verify system of the radiation treatment unit and controlled by a second 
radiation therapist. No treatment should be given before all of the above 
checks have been performed twice. 
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When the patient receives his/her radiation treatment the following 
should be evaluated 
 
4. Initial physical evaluation of patient and pertinent clinical 
information  
 
Before any procedures can be performed on the patient an initial evaluation 
of the patient file has to be performed for the assessment of the patient’s 
diagnosis and staging. This is to be done to determine whether the correct 
procedure is going to be performed.  
 
               Y  N NA 
4.1. Diagnosis of disease             
4.2. Stage of disease              
4.3. Positive histology              
4.4. Physical condition              
4.5. Pertinent pathology report             
4.6. HIV status               
 
5. Patient Identification 
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When a patient arrives at the radiation treatment unit, it is important to 
determine if it is the correct patient who is going to receive radiation 
treatment.  
 
               Y  N NA 
5.1. Patient name               
5.2. ID                
5.3. Photograph               
5.4. Bathing instructions              
5.5. Signed and witnessed consent form           
 
 
 
6. Radiation Treatment Execution 
When the patient enters the radiation treatment room the following has to be 
checked. 
 
               Y  N NA 
6.1. Correct patient               
6.2. Patient support and immobilization devices          
6.3. Patient setup position correct            
6.4. Tattoo location              
6.5. Location of treatment field             
6.6. Source surface distance 100cm            
6.7. Isocentric treatment technique                
6.8. Correct field parameters             
6.9. Special treatment devices             
6.10. Beam modifiers              
 
7. Electronic Portal Images (EPI) 
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Electronic portal images have to done on the first day of treatment to verify 
that the radiation treatment fields are within acceptable limits. 
  
               Y  N NA 
7.1. Electronic portal imaging done as per protocol          
7.2. EPIs within acceptable limits            
 
8. In vivo Measurements 
 
Within the first three radiation treatments, In Vivo measurements have to be 
done to control that the given dose the patient is receiving is within 
acceptable limits. 
               Y  N NA 
8.1. In vivo measurements (diode) done as per protocol         
8.2. In vivo measurements within acceptable limits          
8.3. In vivo measurements signed by physicist          
9. Record Keeping 
 
Primary Check 
 
               Y  N NA 
9.1. File of initials of all individuals who initial the chart         
9.2. Electronic portal images             
9.3. In Vivo dosimetry records             
9.4. MCP check film form              
9.5. Checked by physicist within first three treatments          
 
Daily Check 
               Y  N NA 
9.6. Correct radiation treatment unit            
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9.7. Correct radiation treatment modality           
9.8. Correct radiation beam energy               
9.9. Daily record documenting             
9.10. Daily and cumulative doses            
9.11. MU settings for each field consistent with data in  
  the simulator/setup parameters sheet           
9.12. Radiation therapist signatures            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION D 
 
WEEKLY REVIEW 
 
The weekly review is actually an inspection of all the checks that should 
have been carried out before and during the radiation treatment of the 
patient. As part of the weekly chart review, the reviewer should also 
determine if any new fields have been created or any previously treated 
fields modified. All modified and new treatment fields should be carefully 
reviewed as described in the previous section. 
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1. Overview 
 
               Y  N NA 
1.1. The date of the previous weekly chart review          
1.2. Interval between chart reviews appropriate          
1.3. Chart and the calculations reviewed by physicist         
1.4. Not the same reviewer two weeks in a row          
 
2. Simulation Set-up Notes 
 
The simulator/setup page should be reviewed for each field to determine 
whether the necessary information is accurately and clearly indicated and 
entered as such into the record-and-verify system.  
 
               Y  N NA 
2.1. Patient parameters              
2.2. Patient treatment position             
2.3. Patient support and immobilisation devices          
2.4. Setup instructions              
2.5. Anatomical location of tattoos            
2.6. All physical beam parameters             
2.7. Field size               
2.8. Separation               
2.9. Source surface distance 100cm            
2.10. Isocentric treatment technique                
2.11. Lead blocks/MLC              
2.12. Wax build-up               
2.13. Bite-block / Tongue depressor            
2.14. Radiation therapists              
2.15. Double-check by another radiation therapist          
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3. Radiation Treatment Prescription 
 
With the completion of the simulation of the patient the radiation treatment 
prescription is completed by the oncologist in charge of the patient.  
 
               Y  N NA 
3.1. Treatment site              
3.2. Treatment mode, and energy are identified          
3.3. Treatment field              
3.4. Given dose / Fractionation             
3.5. Central dose / percentage             
3.6. Field size               
3.7. Source surface distance 100cm            
3.8. Isocentric treatment technique                
3.9. Daily dose, total dose and fractionation scheme         
3.10. Prescription has been signed and dated by oncologist         
3.11. Prescription changes have been signed and dated         
3.12. Departmental guidelines followed            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Radiation Monitor Units (MU) Calculation 
 
The radiation monitor units have to reviewed weekly 
 
                  Y N NA 
4.1. Daily dose fractionation calculated is correct          
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4.2. MU consistent with total dose / fractionation scheme         
4.3. Correct factors and parameters used           
4.4. Correct radiation treatment unit            
4.5. Correct radiation treatment modality           
4.6. Correct field size / calculated equivalent square         
4.7. Correct radiation treatment energy           
4.8. Correct patient separation             
4.9. Source surface distance 100cm            
4.10. Isocentric treatment technique                
4.11. If beam blocking is extensive, the appropriate 
equivalent square calculations have been made         
4.12. If use of bolus is extensive, the appropriate 
separation has to be used             
 
5. Electronic Portal Images (EPI) 
 
Electronic portal images have to be present in radiation treatment file for 
radiation treatment units with these facilities.  
 
               Y  N NA 
5.1. Electronic portal imaging done as per protocol          
5.2. EPIs within acceptable limits            
5.3. EPIs signed by oncologist             
 
 
 
 
 
6. In vivo Measurements 
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The in vivo measurement document has to be present in the radiation 
treatment file. 
 
               Y  N NA 
6.1. In vivo measurements done as per protocol          
6.2. In vivo measurements within expected limits          
6.3. In vivo measurements signed by physicist          
 
7. Record Keeping 
 
Primary Check 
  
               Y  N NA 
7.1. File of initials of all individuals who initial the chart         
7.2. Electronic portal images             
7.3. In Vivo dosimetry records             
7.4. MCP check film form              
7.5. Checked by physicist within first three treatments          
 
Daily Check 
 
               Y  N NA 
7.6. Correct radiation treatment unit            
7.7. Correct radiation treatment modality           
7.8. Correct radiation beam energy               
7.9. Daily record documenting             
7.10. Daily and cumulative doses            
7.11. MU settings for each field consistent with data in  
the simulator/setup parameters sheet           
7.12. Record of blocks, wedges, bolus, MLCs, MCPs            
7.13. Radiation therapist signatures            
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The recurrent chart checking theme is to verify that all parameters are 
consistent from prescription to treatment plan to simulator sheet to MU 
calculation to the daily treatment record.  
 
SECTION E 
 
ADVERSE INCIDENTS 
 
1. Discovery of an adverse incident 
 
Upon the discovery of an adverse incident the following actions should be 
followed.  
 
               Y  N NA 
1.1. Identify adverse incident             
1.2. Complete adverse incident report form           
1.3. Report adverse incident             
1.4. If possible, compensate for adverse incident           
 
 
SECTION F 
 
REVIEW AT COMPLETION OF TREATMENT 
 
As a final review before the chart is filed, the following items should be 
checked: 
 
1. Final Review 
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     Y  N NA 
1.1. Prescribed dose delivered             
1.2. Documented according to department policy          
1.3. Treatment summary included            
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APPENDIX 7 
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